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Professional Speech at Scale 
 




Regulatory actions affecting professional speech are facing new challenges from 
all sides. On one side, the Supreme Court has grown increasingly protective of 
professionals’ free speech rights, and it has subjected regulations affecting that speech to 
heightened levels of scrutiny that call into question traditional regulatory practices in both 
law and medicine. On the other side, technological developments, including the growth of 
massive digital platforms and the introduction of artificial intelligence programs, have 
created brand new problems of regulatory scale. Professional speech is now able to reach 
a wide audience faster than ever before, creating risks that misinformation will cause 
public harm long before regulatory processes can gear up to address it. 
 This article examines how these two trends interact in the fields of health-care 
regulation and legal practice. It looks at how these forces work together both to create new 
regulatory problems and to shape the potential government responses to those problems. 
It analyzes the Supreme Court’s developing caselaw on professional speech and predicts 
how the Court’s jurisprudence is likely to shape current legal challenges in law and 
medicine. The Article further examines the regulatory challenges posed by the change in 
scale generated by massive digital platforms and the introduction of artificial intelligence.  
It concludes by recommending ways in which government regulators can meet the new 
challenges posed by technological development without infringing on protected speech. 
The crux of our proposal is that incremental change in the traditional state regulatory 
process is insufficient to meet the challenges posed by changes in technological scale. 
Instead, it is time to ask bigger questions about the underlying goals and first principles 
of professional regulation.  
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Living in an era of massive digital platforms has significant 
implications for professional speech. Mass communication used to be the 
province of established media outlets—newspapers, television and radio 
stations, and magazines. But the internet revolution made mass 
communications available to the individual, and the growth of social 
media, along with easier access to video production and distribution, 
further facilitated communication.1 The growth of massive digital platforms 
has had implications for regulation in general, and matters historically 
falling into the areas of medical, legal, or other licensed professional 
practice are no exception to that trend.  
Doctors and lawyers can now communicate with large audiences; 
their influence is no longer tied to one-on-one consultations. Moreover, 
individuals who lack professional training and licensing can similarly 
communicate with large audiences about legal and medical matters, 
sometimes spreading harmful misinformation. Finally, technology enables 
lawyers and medical professionals to meet face-to-face with clients and 
patients across state lines without the inconvenience of travel.  All of these 
new capabilities raise serious questions about professional licensing.  
The growth in online communication is accompanied by the 
Supreme Court’s increasingly strong interest in, and protection of, 
commercial and professional speech. In a 2018 case, the Court held that 
professional speech was not categorically different from any other type of 
speech.2 This means that going forward, most restrictions on professional 
speech will be analyzed in the same manner as restrictions on non-
professionals’ speech—that is, the speech limitations will typically fall 
under strict scrutiny, the hardest standard to satisfy. Scholars have 
warned that such a ruling would significantly restrict states’ long-standing 
authority to engage in professional regulation—and that such restrictions 
could have far-ranging consequences in areas such as law and medicine.3 
                                          
1 Paul Ohm, Regulating at Scale, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 546 (2018). 
2 Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
3 Amy Kapczynski, The Lochnerized First Amendment and the FDA: Toward A More 
Democratic Political Economy, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 179, 194 (2018) (“These cases pose 
significant risks to public health, whether from more extensive (and less well-understood) 
off-label uses of drugs or more extensive (and less well-understood) uses of electronic and 
conventional cigarettes.”); William French, Note, This Isn't Lochner, It's the First 
Amendment: Reorienting the Right to Contract and Commercial Speech, 114 NW. U.L. REV. 
469, 471 (2019) (acknowledging critics’ fears that “as soon as the First Amendment wholly 
protects commercial speech, economic legislation as the country knows it will crumble”); 
Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith's First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 
182 (2015) (questioning whether the Supreme Court’s increased protection of First 
Amendment rights means that “those who engage in ‘occupational speech,’ like lawyers 
and doctors, have an equivalent right to engage in deliberately false speech”). 
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This Article examines how professional regulation will change given 
both increasing judicial scrutiny and new technological capabilities. It re-
envisions how professional regulation can adapt to the change in 
regulatory scale and, at the same time, meet the Supreme Court’s 
increasingly high bar for speech limitations. Part II begins with an analysis 
of the Supreme Court’s new landscape for regulations affecting speech. It 
examines the constitutional law of professional speech, analyzing how the 
Court has increasingly protected the speech rights of professionals. Part 
III extends the speech analysis further into the particular contexts of law 
and health care, analyzing how current controversies in professional 
regulation will be affected by the Supreme Court’s higher bar for speech 
protection and examining how far the state can go in regulating the 
provision of legal and medical advice. 
Part IV moves to the particular regulatory challenges posed by the 
change in scale generated by both massive digital platforms and artificial 
intelligence. We often think of the doctor-patient and lawyer-client 
relationships as existing within a professional dyad. But what happens 
when lawyers and doctors can reach much larger audiences online, and 
what happens when professionals take a back seat to algorithms? This 
Part examines regulations on telemedicine and technology-assisted legal 
practice as well as pressure to enable cross-border practice in both law 
and medicine.  
Finally, Part V brings these issues together to discuss 
recommendations for how the regulatory landscape should integrate 
technological innovations at the same time as it backs away from relying 
on direct regulation of technological speech. Although technology went 
through a period of extremely rapid change in capability at the turn of the 
millennium, both law and medicine were slow to catch up. The COVID-19 
pandemic swept away prior resistance to change in medicine and law. 
When public health and fundamental justice were on the line, institutions 
quickly adapted to encourage virtual medical visits and even online jury 
trials. The pandemic will end, but the regulatory structure of both law and 
medicine are unlikely to return to their prior status. This Article concludes 
with an analysis of how professional regulation can be re-imagined in the 
modern era to improve the reliability of legal and medical information while 
maintaining an environment of robust and open communication. 
II. THE  SUPREME  COURT’S  GROWING  SKEPTICISM  OF  SPEECH 
LIMITATIONS 
One of the Roberts Court’s most notable jurisprudential 
developments has been its robust protection of First Amendment rights. 
The Roberts Court has been described as “the most free-speech-protective 
6  55 UC DAVIS L.REV. (forthcoming 2022). 1/1/21 
 
 
Supreme Court in memory.”4 This protection is especially apparent when 
regulatory efforts clash with free-speech claims. In recent years, free 
speech advocates have generally prevailed against speech-limiting 
regulatory efforts in diverse areas.5  
Whether this heightened protection is a good thing or a bad thing 
depends on one’s perspective.6 Supporters applaud the Court’s protection 
of civil liberties.7 Critics, on the other hand, charge that the Court “has 
turned the constitutional protection for free speech into a tool with which 
to blow holes in the regulatory state.”8  
Traditional regulatory regimes for law and medicine, after all, 
regulate speech in many ways. Regulatory regimes determine who can 
speak—that is, who is authorized to offer legal or medical advice. They may 
also determine to whom professionals can speak—for example, whether 
licensed professionals may offer services online to out-of-state clients. 
They may determine how professionals speak, especially how they 
structure their businesses—that is, can they partner with individuals 
outside their profession? Can they be employed by a business entity 
funded by outside investors? 
This section examines the likely impact of the Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence on professional regulation. It first examines the 
regulatory landscape within the legal profession and explains how free-
speech claims fit into that landscape. Next, it turns to health care, 
examining how free-speech challenges intersect with traditional regulatory 
authority over medical professionals. Finally, it explores the Supreme 
Court’s recent jurisprudence touching on professional regulation,9 
including a greater emphasis on free-speech rights in the professional 
                                          
4 Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First Amendment, 25 J.L. & 
POL’Y 63, 64 (2016). 
5 See, e.g. Janus v. Am. Fedn. of State, County, and Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 S. 
Ct. 2448 (2018) (striking down public union agency fees); NIFLA, 138 S.Ct. 2361 (striking 
down disclosure requirements for crisis pregnancy centers); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 
U.S. 552 (2011) (striking down state restrictions on the sale of prescription data); Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down campaign finance 
restrictions). 
6 Genevieve Lakier, The First Amendment's Real Lochner Problem, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1241, 
1253–54 (2020) (concluding that critics’ problem with the Supreme Court’s heightened 
speech protection “was not that it illegitimately sought to vindicate unenumerated rights, 
employed overly vague rules of decision, or failed to take adequate account of economic 
inequality,” but that “[w]hat they meant instead was that the Court failed to show adequate 
deference to the policy judgments of democratically elected legislatures”). 
7 Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment in the Era of President Trump, 94 DENV. L. REV. 
553, 557 (2017) (noting that “the Roberts Court has been very protective of speech” by 
“expanding who is protected by the First Amendment's safeguarding of expression”). 
8 Enrique Armijo, Faint-Hearted First Amendment Lochnerism, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1377, 1380 
(2020). 
9NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361. 
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sphere as well as increasing skepticism of professional practices that 
inhibit economic competition.10 It analyzes arguments that the Supreme 
Court’s recent jurisprudence undermines regulatory authority in these 
areas, questioning how far the Court’s current jurisprudence might go in 
limiting traditional areas of regulatory authority over both lawyers and 
medical practitioners. 
A. Protecting Professionals’ Commercial Speech 
Until recently, there were few cases exploring the tension between 
professional regulation and free-speech jurisprudence.11 Law and 
medicine, as two of the earliest recognized professions, have long been 
regulated at the state level through the licensing of professionals.12 In the 
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the story was one of 
regulatory growth: during that period, states adopted licensing and 
regulatory regimes for many professions and occupations, often based on 
the earlier model originally developed for law and for medicine.13 And 
although the Supreme Court struck down some of these early regulatory 
efforts, most notably in its Lochner decision, the Court shifted gears in 
1937 and later upheld state regulatory efforts under a highly deferential 
“reasonable basis” standard.14  
It was not until several decades after the end of the Lochner era that 
the Supreme Court began striking down regulatory actions on free-speech 
grounds.15 These early cases tended to focus on marketing activities, 
protecting the rights of labor-union lawyers to offer representation to 
injured workers16 and striking down advertising prohibitions on 
pharmacies17 and lawyers.18 The Court gave the greatest protection to 
speech rights in cases in which “political expression” was at issue—thus 
protecting the rights of the NAACP and the ACLU to seek clients in high-
profile civil-rights litigation.19 
                                          
10 North Carolina Bd. of Dental Examiners vs. FTC, 574 U.S. 494 (2015). 
11 Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech and the First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 183, 
184 (2014) (noting that "[t]he protection available to occupational speech 'is one of the least 
developed areas of First Amendment doctrine.").  
12 Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control 
Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1172 (2003). 
13 Id. 
14 Armijo, supra note 8. 
15 Nick Robinson, The Multiple Justifications of Occupational Licensing, 93 WASH. L. REV. 
1903 (2018). 
16 Bhd. of R. R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). 
17 Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976). 
18 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
19 Natl. Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) 
(stating that “[i]n the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving 
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When marketing activities arose from a desire for payment rather 
than a desire to effect political change, the Court still offered some 
protection, though at a lower level of scrutiny. Applying intermediate 
scrutiny to commercial speech allowed the Court to uphold some 
restrictions, such as limitations on direct personal solicitation of clients.20 
In upholding the restriction, the Court noted that the “procurement of 
remunerative employment is  . . . only marginally affected with First 
Amendment concerns,” and that it “falls within the State’s proper sphere 
of economic and professional regulation.”21 
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has suggested that it 
may be backing away from its prior dicta that appeared to devalue 
commercial speech.22 In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., pharmaceutical 
companies challenged a Vermont restriction that barred the sale of 
doctors’ prescription data for marketing purposes, although it allowed the 
data to be shared for non-commercial uses.23 Vermont argued that the 
prohibition regulated conduct, rather than speech, and it asserted that 
even if the prohibition did limit speech, the state had an interest in 
protecting doctors’ privacy that was sufficient to justify a restriction on 
commercial speech.24 The Supreme Court disagreed with the state’s 
position and struck down the prohibition.25 It explained that “[t]he 
commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, 
provides a forum where ideas and information flourish” and that it was up 
to “the speaker and the audience, not the government” to assess the value 
of that information.26 The Court suggested that commercial speech 
restrictions could be supported when necessary to combat false or 
misleading advertising and related marketplace harms but that a state 
may not impose regulatory restrictions that burden commercial speech 
when the state’s goal is “to tilt public debate in a preferred direction.”27 
                                          
private differences” but is rather “a form of political expression”); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 
412, 434 (1978) (“Where political expression or association is at issue, this Court has not 
tolerated the degree of imprecision that often characterizes government regulation of the 
conduct of commercial affairs.”). 
20 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).  
21 Id. at 459. 
22 Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133–206, 196 (2016)  (noting that 
“the Supreme Court arguably cast a shadow on commercial speech's lower-value status in 
Sorrell”). 
23 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 579. 
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 578-79. 
9  55 UC DAVIS L.REV. (forthcoming 2022). 1/1/21 
 
 
B. Protecting the Content of Professional Speech 
The Supreme Court’s early cases largely examined how professionals 
attracted business—they did not touch on the scope of professional speech 
or regulation once that professional relationship had been established. In 
fact, the Court had been so deferential to state regulation that many 
observers believed that professional speech was “categorically exempted” 
from First Amendment scrutiny once a “personal nexus between 
professional and client” had been established.28  
The “personal nexus” concept came from a concurrence by Justice 
White in Lowe v. Securities Exchange, but was never adopted by the 
Supreme Court itself.29 The case arose when the SEC sought to restrain an 
individual who was not a registered securities advisor from publishing 
newsletters that offered investment advice. Because the Supreme Court 
held that the SEC’s enabling act exempted the newsletter from regulation, 
it did not have to decide whether the First Amendment would have 
protected the newsletter writer. Justice White’s concurrence, however, 
delved into the First Amendment principles, concluding that it was 
necessary “to locate the point where regulation of a profession leaves off 
and prohibitions on speech begin.”30 Justice White drew the line between 
advising individual clients and offering general advice to the public at 
large—the former type of speech, in his view, was subject to regulation as 
the speech was merely incidental to practicing a profession, but the latter 
was protected by the First Amendment.31  
Even though Justice White’s view was never adopted by a majority 
of the Supreme Court, it influenced lower courts, who cited it often in 
upholding speech restrictions incidental to professional regulation.32 
Under the approach adopted by these lower courts, speech directed 
generally at the public would be protected by heightened scrutiny under 
the First Amendment, but speech within the confines of a licensed 
professional-client relationship could be subject to content-neutral 
regulation by the state under a rational-basis standard.33 Under this view, 
for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld a law that banned sexual orientation 
change efforts therapy.34 The court reasoned that because the law 
prohibited treatment, not discussions about treatment, it regulated 
                                          
28 Robinson, supra note 17 at 1930. 
29 Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the result); Sherman, 
supra note 11, at 185. 
30 Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232. 
31 Id. 
32 Sherman, supra note 11, at 187 ("[L]ower courts have generally found Justice White's 
test to be satisfied by the existence of any personal nexus between speaker and listener."). 
33 See, e.g., Kagan v. City of New Orleans, La., 753 F.3d 560 (2014). 
34 Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 2014) abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam. 
and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).  
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conduct and not speech.35 This speech/conduct distinction follows from 
case law developed by district courts and adopted, in some cases, by 
courts of appeals.36 According to the court, treatment constitutes conduct 
even if it consists entirely of speech, as with psychotherapy.37 
The Supreme Court moved away from this deferential approach in 
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra.38 The Court in 
NIFLA faced a challenge to the Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, 
Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (“FACT Act”), which had two 
disclosure requirements. First, it required pregnancy centers to distribute 
or post a notice informing the public about California’s free and low-cost 
reproductive health programs that provided services such as 
contraception and abortions.39 Second, it required unlicensed centers to 
distribute a notice stating that they were not licensed. A variety of 
pregnancy centers challenged the notice as unconstitutional compelled 
speech and sought a preliminary injunction against its enforcement.  
In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court held 
that both disclosure requirements violate the First Amendment. The Court 
criticized decisions from the courts of appeals that “except[ed] professional 
speech from the rule that content-based regulations of speech are subject 
to strict scrutiny.”40 The Court explained that “this Court has not 
recognized ‘professional speech’ as a separate category of speech.”41 It 
stated that professional speech was afforded less protection than other 
speech only in “two circumstances”: first, when a law requires 
professionals to disclose “factual, noncontroversial information” about the 
services they provide and second, when a regulation of conduct 
“incidentally involves” speech.42  
                                          
35 Id. at 1230. 
36 See Wynter K. Miller & Benjamin E. Berkman, The Future of Physicians' First Amendment 
Freedom: Professional Speech in an Era of Radically Expanded Prenatal Genetic Testing, 76 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 577, 653 (2019) (“The lower courts have repeatedly approached the 
problem of identifying professional speech by attempting to differentiate “medical conduct” 
from physician speech.”). 
37 Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 (“[A] regulation of only treatment itself—whether physical 
medicine or mental health treatment—implicates free speech interests only incidentally, if 
at all”). 
38 NIFLA, 138 S.Ct. at 2361; See Rodney A. Smolla, Commercial Speech in Specific 
Contexts—Commercial Speech and Professional Services—Regulation of ‘Professional 
Speech’, 2 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 20:37.40 (2020) (“The Supreme Court 
largely obliterated the nascent professional speech doctrine in National Institute of Family 
& Life Advocates v. Becerra.”). 
39 NIFLA, 138 S.Ct. at 2369. 
40Id. at 2371. 
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 2372. 
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The Court concluded that neither of those circumstances applied to 
the California law.43 It explained that the notice about state-based low-cost 
health programs “in no way relates to the services that licensed clinics 
provide,” but instead informed clients about other services provided by the 
state.44 Furthermore, the requirement more than “incidentally” involved 
speech—its very purpose was communication.45  
The disclosure of licensure status came closer to qualifying for 
deferential treatment as a factual, noncontroversial statement about 
services provided, but the Court concluded that even if the more 
deferential standard applied, the disclosure requirement would still fail for 
being unduly burdensome.46 The Court held that the state had the burden 
of proof to establish that the licensing disclosure was “neither unjustified 
nor unduly burdensome.”47 To do so, it would have to show an alleged 
harm that is “potentially real and not purely hypothetical,” and a 
disclosure requirement that extends “no broader than reasonably 
necessary” to avoid “chilling protected speech.”48 The Court concluded that 
the state had failed to establish more than hypothetical harms and had 
failed to tailor the disclosure requirement, stating that the law “targets 
speakers, not speech, and imposes an unduly burdensome disclosure 
requirement that will chill their protected speech.”49 
The Supreme Court’s NIFLA decision surprised many onlookers. 
Constitutional law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky believed that it would be 
easy for the Supreme Court to uphold the law.50 After all, “traditionally, 
warnings and disclosures had not drawn constitutional attacks.”51 The 
Court’s decision suggests that lower courts’ interpretation of law will need 
substantial rethinking. In particular, the speech/conduct distinction is 
unlikely to play a dispositive role in future cases, even when there is a 
“personal nexus” between a licensed professional and an individual client 
or patient. As one scholar explained, “although the Court has upheld 
regulations of professional conduct that incidentally involved speech, it 
does not automatically assume that regulations that apply to professionals 
                                          
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 2373-74. 
46 Id. at 2378. 
47 Id. at 2377. 
48 Id. at 2377-78. 
49 Id. at 2378. 
50 Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: Ensuring Accurate Information for Patients Does Not 
Violate the First Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 12, 2017, 1:35 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/12/symposium-ensuring-accurate-information-
patients-not-violate-first-amendment/. 
51 Andra Lim, Limiting NIFLA, 72 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129 (2020) (“traditionally, warnings and 
disclosures had not drawn constitutional attacks.”). 
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are always regulations of conduct.”52 He pointed out that the plaintiffs 
themselves in NIFLA provided both advice and pregnancy-related medical 
services, and that “[t]he mere fact that the plaintiffs were licensed 
professionals did not render all of their advice regulable conduct.”53 
Instead, the Court recognized that the First Amendment protects the 
content of licensed professionals’ speech.  
C. Protecting the Marketplace against Anti-Competitive 
Regulation 
Along with protecting commercial and professional speech, the 
Supreme Court has also recently limited the power of some licensing 
boards to use their licensing power to control the speech of non-licensed 
individuals. In North Carolina, the state dental board challenged 
individuals who operated teeth-whitening kiosks in shopping malls, 
alleging that they were practicing dentistry without a license.54 The Federal 
Trade Commission filed an administrative complaint, arguing that the 
board’s decision  “constituted an anticompetitive and unfair method of 
competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act.”55 The board 
claimed immunity from antitrust regulation as a state entity, and further 
argued that the state had delegated power to the board to regulate matters 
affecting public safety.56  
When the dispute reached the Supreme Court, the Court sided with 
the FTC. It concluded that the dental board was not immune from 
antitrust liability because it was controlled by “market participants.”57 The 
Court explained that a “nonsovereign actor controlled by active market 
participants” would qualify for immunity only if it met two requirements: 
first, that the restraint of trade “be one clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed as state policy,” and second, that it “be actively supervised by 
the State.”58 The Court found that the policy of prohibiting the 
unauthorized practice of dentistry was clearly established, but that the 
inclusion of teeth-whitening as “dentistry” was less clear. Nor was there 
any state involvement in the decision to categorize teeth-whitening as 
dentistry—that decision was made by the board, a majority of which 
consisted of practicing dentists.59 The domination of the regulatory board 
                                          
52 Michael E. Rosman, Is It Time to Revisit the Constitutionality of Unauthorized Practice of 
Law Rules?, 20 FEDERALIST SOC'Y REV. 74, 78 (2019). 
53 Id. 
54 N. Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C., 574 U.S. 494 (2015). 
55 Id. at 501. 
56 Id.; see also id. at 522 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. at 504. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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by market participants, the Court stated, created a “risk that active market 
participants will pursue private interests in restraining trade.”60 
Although the Supreme Court’s decision was not based expressly on a 
free-speech rationale, the decision will still reshape state regulatory 
authority of matters involving professional speech. A licensing regime, 
after all, is a means of “essentially granting ‘speech monopolies’” to those 
it licenses.61 Licensing practices identify a “class of speakers who may 
engage in certain forms of communication,” thereby “entrench[ing] the 
power of those speakers” in relation to those who lack such state-
sanctioned authority.62 Thus, by limiting the power of practitioner-
dominated state boards to engage in protectionist activity, the Supreme 
Court was protecting the free-speech rights of unlicensed individuals.63 As 
with the Court’s other cases, however, the decision meant that 
professional regulatory bodies would be given less deference.  
In some ways, this decision may risk undermining the goals of 
professional regulation. Professor Claudia Haupt, who has written 
extensively about professional speech, has argued that the professions 
should be thought of as “knowledge communities.”64 She points out that 
state regulations that limit or control the content of professional speech 
may be more defensible if those restrictions depend on the professional 
judgment of the American Medical Association or equivalent entities.65 
Increased participation of political entities, in her view, “should result in a 
high degree of skepticism toward state interference at odds with 
professional insights.”66  
Even so, one of the likely results of the North Carolina Board of Dental 
Examiners case is greater political oversight over state professional boards. 
From the beginning, it was clear that the case would affect professional 
regulation beyond dentistry. At oral argument, Justice Breyer raised the 
question of whether a decision in favor of the FTC could affect medical 
credentialing and expressed concern that “neurologists, not non-physician 
state regulators,” be allowed “to decide who can be a neurologist.”67 
                                          
60 Id. at 510. 
61 Robert Kry, The "Watchman for Truth": Professional Licensing and the First Amendment, 
23 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 885, 974 (2000). 
62 Id. 
63 Armijo, supra note 8, at 1420–21 (“When the state has the power to revoke an 
occupational license for a speech-related reason and the grounds for revocation are subject 
to a lesser standard of constitutional review, the government grants itself the speech-hostile 
. . . power to ban individuals from the occupations of their choice based on what they say.”). 
64 Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech and the Content-Neutrality Trap, 127 YALE L.J. 
FORUM 150, 171 (2017). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Eric M. Fraser, Argument Analysis: Court Wary of Immunity for Licensing Boards, but 
What About Doctors?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 15, 2014, 12:29 PM), 
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Although Justice Breyer ultimately joined the majority decision, his 
concern was not unwarranted—commentators have noted that 
“neurologists and other doctors are just as capable of anticompetitive 
actions as are dentists.”68 The opinion does not carve out an exception for 
regulations resting on specialized medical knowledge. 
The Dental Examiners opinion has influenced legal regulation as well. 
LegalZoom, a company that helps customers “create their own legal 
documents addressing a variety of routine legal matters” joined with other 
legal services providers and law professors to file an amicus brief in 
support of the FTC.69 LegalZoom explained that it had also “been subject 
to anticompetitive actions taken by self- and financially-interested 
regulatory agencies controlled by private market participants that have 
threatened to restrict the market choices available to consumers,” 
including in the state of North Carolina. After the Supreme Court ruled for 
the FTC, LegalZoom managed to reach a favorable settlement with 
regulators.70 
In the five years after the Supreme Court’s decision, there has been “a 
wave of private action suits against various state occupational licensing 
authorities.”71 One of those cases involved a Texas restriction on 
telemedicine treatment.72 The federal district court relied on the Supreme 
Court’s Dental Examiners decision to conclude that the plaintiffs had 
successfully set out a prima facie case showing that their antitrust claim 
would likely succeed. The district court therefore granted an injunction 
against the regulation.73 The state regulatory board “later dropped its 
appeal, seemingly fearing that the circuit court would rule that the 
regulation did not have state action immunity.”74 




69 Brief of Legalzoom.com, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, N. Carolina 
State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C, 574 U.S. 494 (2015), 2014 WL 3895926 (2014). 
70 Keith A. Call, Could Our "Ethics" Actually Be Illegal?, 29 UTAH B.J. 34 (May/June 2016) 
(noting that a suit filed in the wake of the Dental Examiners case “resulted in a consent 
decree that allows LegalZoom to provide certain types of legal services in North Carolina, 
subject to certain consumer protection measures”); Caroline Shipman, Unauthorized 
Practice of Law Claims Against Legalzoom--Who Do These Lawsuits Protect, and Is the Rule 
Outdated?, 32 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 939, 947 (2019) (noting the North Carolina Legislature 
also passed a bill setting parameters similar to those of the settlement). 
71 Robinson, supra note15. 
72 Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529 (W.D. Tex. 2015). 
73 Id. 
74 Robinson, supra note 15. 




The Court’s speech jurisprudence is new enough that it’s too soon 
to tell just how far it will go in limiting regulation in traditional professional 
spheres like law and medicine. But the Court’s recent decisions raise 
significant questions that continue to spawn a great deal of litigation likely 
to affect the regulatory landscape in both medicine and law. This section 
examines the most significant of those ongoing challenges in law and 
health care and analyzes what the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence might 
mean for traditional regulatory actions in these areas of professional 
practice. 
A. The Free Speech Landscape in Legal Practice 
At its core, the regulation of legal practice is the regulation of 
speech.75 The practice of law, in fact, is only speech—while many doctors 
may perform surgery or other physical procedures on patients, lawyers do 
not. Historically, the regulation of legal practice has centered on two areas. 
First is the question of who can speak—that is, how does the state license 
individual practitioners and how does it stop non-licensed individuals from 
encroaching on areas carved out for licensed attorneys? The second area 
of regulatory tension relates to what can be said, especially for the purpose 
of marketing legal services.  
The last twenty years have seen major change in some aspects of 
lawyer regulation and growing frustration at the lack of change in other 
areas. States have offered greater uniformity and reciprocity in licensing, 
making law degrees more geographically portable than in prior decades.76 
At the same time, regulatory changes have failed to improve access to legal 
services, creating growing dissatisfaction with the unavailability of legal 
services to even middle-class individuals and small businesses.77  
A few states have voluntarily begun to experiment with loosening 
regulatory structures in order to promote access to justice. The state of 
Washington was one of the first to license non-lawyer professionals to 
undertake some tasks historically reserved for lawyers, but the state 
abandoned the program when costs appeared to outweigh the program’s 
                                          
75 See Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1302-03 (2016) (noting 
that many professions are based in speech, and that “[i]t is therefore all the more troubling 
that there has not yet been a comprehensive theory of professional speech advanced in the 
courts and the legal literature.”). 
76 Robert J. Derocher, Breaking Barriers: In a Changing Profession, What Is the Impact of 




77 Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Facebook Disruption: How Social Media May Transform 
Civil Litigation and Facilitate Access to Justice, 65 ARK. L. REV. 75, 75–98 (2012). 
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benefit.78 Other states have taken a much more radical approach. The Utah 
Supreme Court adopted a “sandbox” program to pilot “new and innovative 
legal business models and services.”79 And Arizona has gone the furthest, 
enacting a wholesale change in late August 2020 that “has gotten rid of 
two of what many consider the main pillars of our professional 
independence: the rule against fee-splitting with non-lawyers and the rule 
against paid-for recommendations.”80  
Most of the states, however, continue to maintain traditional 
regulatory structures. These states are increasingly facing legal 
challenges, often based on free speech grounds. In recent years, litigation 
has challenged licensing restrictions that prohibit non-lawyers from 
offering legal advice, prohibitions on non-lawyer ownership of law firms, 
and restrictions on marketing and commercial speech. 
1. Licensure 
In general, states have taken a harder line on “unauthorized practice” 
rules in law (known as “UPL”) than in medicine. In medicine, most 
unauthorized practice prosecutions focus on individuals who falsely hold 
themselves out to be licensed professionals. Although legal practice also 
has such cases, there are also many cases involving individuals who were 
honest about their status as non-lawyers.81 Before the 1980s, there had 
been “surprisingly few constitutional challenges to unauthorized practice 
prohibitions.”82 In fact, a study by Professor Deborah Rhode identified only 
ten reported decisions considering First Amendment claims at all.83  
Some of the earliest free-speech challenges to lawyer regulation 
occurred when state bars tried to limit assistance to individuals engaged 
in self-help legal practice. Texas famously prosecuted a legal publisher for 
printing forms intended to be used by pro se litigants.84 More recently, state 
bars have gone after online service providers such as LegalZoom.85 In 
                                          
78 Lyle Moran, How the Washington Supreme Court's LLLT Program Met Its Demise, ABA J., 
July 9, 2020.  
79 Utah Supreme Court, The Office of Legal Services Innovation,  
https://sandbox.utcourts.gov/. 
80 Ron Minkoff, Arizona's Sweeping Rule Changes Permit More Non-Lawyer Involvement in 
Legal Services, FRANKFURT KURNIT KLEIN & SELZ PC PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW BLOG 
(Sept. 9, 2020), https://professionalresponsibility.fkks.com/post/102ge8x/arizonas-
sweeping-rule-changes-permit-more-non-lawyer-involvement-in-legal-servi. 
81 Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical 
Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 33 (1981) (finding that a 
minority of unauthorized practice claims “concerned laymen fraudulently holding 
themselves out as attorneys”). 
82 Id. at 44. 
83 Id. 
84 In re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1999). 
85 Catherine J. Lanctot, Does Legal Zoom Have First Amendment Rights? Some Thoughts 
About Freedom of Speech and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
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recent years, the number of such challenges has grown—though appellate 
courts have “uniformly rejected such challenges . . . based on a wide 
variety of unconvincing rationales,” such as the idea that nonlawyers’ legal 
advice is conduct rather than speech, or that if legal advice is speech, it is 
merely “incidental” to conduct.86  
Yet as the free-speech challenges in this area grow, courts are 
increasingly having to grapple with questions about whether their 
precedent is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent protection of 
professional speech. Ohio case law offers a recent example of this tension. 
Ohio has taken an explicitly “expansive” position.87 Cincinnati B. Assn. v. 
Foreclosure Sols involved a complaint against advisors who helped families 
try to avoid foreclosure on their homes.  In enjoining the conduct and 
imposing penalties on the defendants, the court held that efforts to “advise 
[others] of their legal rights,” can qualify as the unauthorized practice of 
law.88 Under the court’s holding, it did not matter whether the advisors 
held themselves out as attorneys; the court stated that “laypersons may 
not insulate themselves  . . . by simply informing customers facing 
foreclosure that the layperson is not an attorney and is, therefore, 
incapable of giving legal advice.”89 Unfortunately, this Ohio case did not 
grapple directly with potential First Amendment defenses to the UPL claim; 
the issue may not have been raised by the defendants. The Ohio Attorney 
General did file an amicus brief urging the court to adopt a “carefully 
crafted” definition of the practice of law, warning the court that an overly 
broad standard could “easily, although inadvertently, sweep into their 
ambit the many legitimate housing counselors who provide vital and 
valuable loss-mitigation and foreclosure prevention counseling in Ohio.”90 
 While that case didn’t directly address free-speech claims, two 
justices on the Ohio Supreme Court have signaled a willingness to 
reconsider the court’s earlier precedents on First Amendment grounds. 
Justice Patrick DeWine, joined by Justice Sharon Kennedy dissented when 
the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a UPL charge based on an individual’s 
action taken to help a church avoid foreclosure.91 The facts show that the 
individual had taken three actions on behalf of the church: he (1) “advised 
                                          
REV. 255, 262 (2011); Mathew Rotenberg, Stifled Justice: The Unauthorized Practice of Law 
and Internet Legal Resources, 97 MINN. L. REV. 709, 725 (2012). 
86 Michele Cotton, Improving Access to Justice by Enforcing the Free Speech Clause, 83 
BROOK. L. REV. 111, 155 (2017). 
87 Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Foreclosure Sols., L.L.C., 914 N.E.2d 386, 389 (Ohio 2009) (“We 
have defined the practice of law expansively.”). 
88 Id. at 390. 
89 Id.  
90 Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Foreclosure Sols., L.L.C., 914 N.E.2d 386 (Ohio 2009), 2009 WL 
1939104 (June 25, 2009). 
91 Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Watkins Glob. Network, 150 N.E.3d 68 (Ohio 2020). 
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the church to try to ‘find a solution before [the matter got] out of hand’ and 
suggested that it ‘try to raise the needed funds’ and accept a settlement 
offer from PNC Bank” (2) he “apparently indicated to the bank's attorney 
that the bank should ‘mediate’ rather than litigate the dispute,” and (3) he 
“may have expressed to the bank's attorney that he didn't believe that the 
church should owe on the debt.”92 None of this advice was clearly wrong, 
and the defendant had never purported to be acting as an attorney. Even 
so, the court found this evidence strong enough to support a $1,000 fine 
and an injunction against further action. 
 In his dissent, Justice DeWine wrote that “merely expressing an 
opinion with legal implications is not the practice of law,” and that “a 
corollary of the principle that one doesn't violate our rules merely by 
voicing an opinion with legal implications is that one doesn't violate our 
rules just because one offers such an opinion in the course of providing 
another service to a client.”93 DeWine pointed to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in NIFLA to explain that “[o]ur authority to regulate the practice 
of law is further limited by the associational and free-speech rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.”94 
Justice DeWine also noted that “the Ohio State Bar Association, a 
professional association of lawyers, is acting as the prosecutor in this case” 
and cited the Dental Examiners case for the proposition that the Supreme 
Court had recently held that regulatory schemes relying on “active market 
participants” may violate antitrust law.95 
2. Outside Investment in Law Practice 
Most states retain restrictions on the “corporate practice of law”—that 
is, allowing nonlawyers to invest in law practices or to own law firms. 
Professor Renee Knake Jefferson has argued that corporate practice 
restrictions violate the First Amendment. She asserts that “commercial 
speech about the delivery of legal services is inherently political speech, 
speech that goes to the heart of meaningful access to the law, speech 
deserving of the strongest protection that the Constitution offers.” She 
therefore believes that bans on external investment necessarily “function 
as content regulation that suppresses ideas.”96 The law firm of Jacoby and 
Meyers, LLP has made similar arguments challenging the corporate 
practice doctrine in court; it sued in New York, New Jersey, and 
Connecticut, arguing that the ban on investment violates the firm’s 
                                          
92 Id. at 80 (DeWine, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
93 Id.  at 78  (DeWine, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
94 Id. at 79 citing Natl. Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S.Ct. 2361, 2371-
2372, (2018). 
95 Id. at 79.  
96 Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 
36 (2012). 
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constitutional rights.97 The law firm lost its challenges in New York and 
Connecticut and voluntarily dismissed its New Jersey case.98 Even so, the 
underlying constitutional issues are likely to be picked up by others 
making similar claims in the future. 
3. Marketing and Commercial Speech 
Protection for commercial speech continues to be a source of 
tension in legal regulation. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
which form the basis of most states’ rules, now prohibit only “false or 
misleading communication” in advertising claims.99 Even under the more 
relaxed modern regulatory scheme, however, there is plenty of room for 
disagreement about the allowable scope of attorney speech. For example, 
states may take a hard line in defining what is “misleading.” In one recent 
case, an advertisement was held to be misleading when it “featured a 
relatively comic and innocuous fictional vignette in which an insurance 
company is depicted as capitulating and settling its case upon learning 
the identity of the plaintiff’s personal injury firm.”100 Of course, there is 
room for judicial interpretation in deciding what constitutes a “misleading” 
communication. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s decision in NIFLA 
suggests that restrictive decisions are vulnerable if they rely merely on 
“hypothetical” harms.101 Without evidence that a reasonable client is likely 
to be misled by such an advertisement, the prohibition should fail.  
Attorney speech that falls in the gray area between “commercial” 
and “political” speech is sometimes subject to challenge. The Virginia 
Supreme Court was sharply divided when one attorney was charged with 
a disciplinary violation for failing to label his blog posts, which discussed 
criminal justice issues, as “advertisements.” Ultimately the court upheld 
the labeling requirement, concluding that the attorney used his blog as a 
way to generate client interest and that the state could therefore compel 
him to label the posts.102 Two dissenting justices, however, would have held 
differently; they argued that “[w]hen commercial and political elements are 
intertwined in speech, the heightened scrutiny test must apply to all of the 
speech.”103 The case was decided several years before the Supreme Court’s 
                                          
97 Cassandra Burke Robertson, Private Ordering in the Market for Professional Services, 94 
B.U. L. REV. 179, 191 (2014). 
98 Charles Toutant, Jacoby & Meyers Drops Bid for Nonlawyer Equity Stake, N.J. L. J. (July 
29, 2014); Mark Dubois, Jacoby & Meyers Case-Not Only Unsuccessful but Moot, Too, CONN. 
L. TRIB. (March 27, 2017). 
99 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT  r. 7.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
100 Rodney A. Smolla, The Puffery of Lawyers, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (2002). 
101 Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018). 
102 Hunter v. Virginia State Bar ex rel. Third Dist. Comm., 744 S.E.2d 611, 620 (Va. 2013) 
(“Hunter's blogs are commercial speech and, thus, constitute lawyer advertising.”). 
103 Id. at 623 (Lemons, J., dissenting). 
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NIFLA decision, and if the situation arose now, the attorney’s case against 
compelled disclosure would be even stronger. 
B. The Free Speech Landscape in Health Care 
In many ways, medicine is regulated far more extensively than 
law.104 For example, while plaintiffs can litigate pro se,105 patients cannot 
write their own prescriptions.106 Whereas legal practice is largely self-
regulated, the practice of medicine is subject to constraints imposed by 
both state and federal legislatures and administrative agencies.107 The 
plethora of health care regulations have generated a profusion of litigation, 
including First Amendment free speech claims.108 The number and variety 
of such claims in medicine far exceeds the scope of litigation over 
professional speech in the legal field.   
While the Supreme Court has consistently trended towards favoring 
free speech rights, the lower courts have been less consistent in health 
care professional conduct cases. Predictions are especially difficult to 
make when litigation is driven by political agendas, such as a desire to 
impede abortions or medical marijuana.109 Below is a sampling of cases in 
which medical professionals have asserted freedom of speech claims.  
                                          
104 Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal 
Profession? 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 461-465 (2008) (arguing that lawyers are the only self-
regulated profession and are therefore less regulated than other professions, like medicine, 
because those professions are subject to control by legislatures whereas the legal 
profession answers to and is regulated by itself); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Professions are 
Dead, Long Live the Professions: Legal Practice in a Postprofessional World, 33 L. & SOC’Y 
REV. 713, 714-715 (1999) (discussing the change in the medical profession from self-
regulation to corporate and institutional regulation and comparing it to the legal profession 
which still functions as a self-regulated profession and is therefore less regulated than the 
medical industry).  
105 United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, Pro Se Litigants / Representing 
Yourself, http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/general/prose-litigants.htm (last visited January 
9, 2021). 
106 Washington State Department of Health, Who Can Prescribe and Administer Prescriptions 
in Washington State, 
https://www.doh.wa.gov/LicensesPermitsandCertificates/ProfessionsNewReneworUpdate
/PharmacyCommission/WhoCanPrescribeandAdministerPrescriptions (last visited 
January 9, 2021). 
107 Barton, supra note 104, at 461-65; Medscape, Key Regulations Affecting a Physician's 
Practice, https://www.medscape.com/courses/section/870050 (last visited January 2, 
2021) (asserting that “[h]ealthcare is one of the most regulated industries in the United 
States” and that the “list of regulations and acts that affect the management of a physician's 
office is daunting”). 
108 See generally, Jessica Clara Schidlow, Prescribing Politics: A Call for Stronger First 
Amendment Protection of Physician-Patient Communications from State Interference in the 
Practice of Medicine, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 12, 2016), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/prescribing-politics-call-stronger-first-
amendment-protection-physician-patient. 
109 Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judicial Impartiality in A Partisan Era, 70 FLA. L. REV. 739, 
763 (2018) (explaining that both the country and the judiciary have grown increasingly 




Like lawyers, health care professionals generally must have 
appropriate licenses from each state in which they practice.110  Licensing 
requirements have generated several lawsuits.   
To illustrate, in Hines v. Quillivan,111  a veterinarian alleged that a 
Texas statute that prohibited the practice of veterinary medicine by phone 
and absent a valid veterinarian-client-patient relationship violated his 
First (and Fourteenth) Amendment rights.112  The district court found that 
the law was content-neutral and ruled against Dr. Hines.113  However, the 
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case in light of NIFLA and related 
cases, instructing the district court to assess whether the statute 
regulated conduct or speech.114 
In Rosemond v. Markham, the author of a long-running newspaper 
parenting advice column sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging 
that the Kentucky Board of Examiners of Psychology's effort to prohibit 
him from calling himself as a “family psychologist” violated his First 
Amendment free speech rights.115  The court held that Board's attempted 
regulation of the plaintiff’s tagline at the bottom of his advice column was 
a content-based restriction subject to strict scrutiny, which it did not 
survive.116  More specifically, the court asserted: 
Rosemond is entitled to express his views and the fact that he is not 
a Kentucky-licensed psychologist does not change that fact. If the 
facts were different, had Rosemond represented himself to be a 
Kentucky-licensed psychologist or had he actually entered into a 
client-patient relationship in Kentucky, the outcome might be 
different.117 
                                          
politically polarized, but noting that “political bias is especially hard to pin down” in judicial 
rulings when there is no clear line between judicial ideology and interpretation). 
110 Robert Kocher, Doctors Without State Borders: Practicing Across State Lines, HEALTH AFF. 
BLOG (Feb. 18, 2014), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20140218.036973/full/; Washington 
State Department of Health, License Requirements, 
https://www.doh.wa.gov/LicensesPermitsandCertificates/ProfessionsNewReneworUpdate
/HealthcareProfessionalCredentialingRequirements (last visited July 16, 2020).  See e.g., 
OH REV. CODE § 4731.41(A) (2019) (“No person shall practice medicine and surgery, or any 
of its branches, without the appropriate license or certificate from the state medical board 
to engage in the practice.”). 
111 Hines v. Quillivan, 395 F.Supp.3d 857, 860 (2019). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 864-66. 
114 Hines v. Quillivan, 982 F.3d 266, 272 (2020). 
115 Rosemond v. Markham, 135 F. Supp. 3d 574, 578 (E.D. Ky. 2015). 
116 Id. at 586, 589. 
117 Id. at 589. 
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This outcome is markedly different from that of Cincinnati B. Assn. v. 
Foreclosure Sols, discussed above.118 Faced with similar claims related to 
legal advice, an Ohio court prohibited nonlawyers from helping families 
facing foreclosure and imposed penalties on them for doing so.  
A Georgia licensing case involved the regulation of midwifery.119 
Deborah Pulley, who worked as a certified professional midwife for forty 
years and delivered over one-thousand babies, asserted that a Georgia 
statute prohibiting individuals from calling themselves midwives unless 
they had a nursing degree violated her free speech rights.120  The case 
quickly settled, and the state agreed not to pursue cases against midwives 
such as Ms. Pulley in the future.121 
2. Compelled Speech and Forbidden Topics 
Many professional speech cases have arisen in health care because 
states attempted to force practitioners to make certain statements or 
prohibited them from engaging in particular forms of speech.  Below are a 
number of examples. 
Conversion Therapy 
Twenty states have passed laws prohibiting therapists from 
practicing conversion therapy122 on gay minors.123  When opponents 
challenged those laws in the Third Circuit and Ninth Circuits before NIFLA, 
the courts upheld the legislation.124 The Third Circuit applied intermediate 
                                          
118 See text associated with notes 87-90. 
119 Jim Manley & Caleb Trotter, Call the Midwife — but Not if You Live in Georgia, THE HILL 
(Dec. 16, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/474216-call-the-midwife-but-
not-if-you-live-in-georgia.  
120 Id.; Pulley v. Izlar, No. 1:19-cv-05574, (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2019), available at 
https://pacificlegal.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Debbie-Pulley-v.-Janice-Izlar-
Complaint.pdf. 
121 Pulley v. Thompson, No. 1:19-cv-05574-AT, Consent Order and Final Judgment, (N.D. 
Ga. Jul. 8, 2020), available at https://pacificlegal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/12/Pulley-v.-Thompson-Consent-Order-Final-Judgment.pdf 
(“Defendant agrees that the Board will only pursue cases involving the unlicensed practice 
of nursing (including midwifery) in Georgia for cases involving unlicensed individuals 
unlawfully practicing midwifery or holding themselves out to the public as being able to 
practice nursing (midwifery) lawfully in the State of Georgia.”).   
122 Conversion therapy aims to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity, and 
many consider it to be discredited and harmful.  See The Trevor Project, About Conversion 
Therapy, https://www.thetrevorproject.org/get-involved/trevor-advocacy/50-bills-50-
states/about-conversion-therapy/ (last visited January 2, 2021). 
123 Family Equality, Conversion Therapy Laws, 
https://www.familyequality.org/resources/conversion-therapy-laws/ (last visited July 14, 
2020). 
124 King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3rd Cir. 2014) overruled in part by NIFLA, 138 
S.Ct. at 2371-2372 (noting that SCOTUS has not recognized “professional speech” as a 
separate category of speech and stating that speech is not unprotected by the First 
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scrutiny and reasoned that the law was defensible under the First 
Amendment because it advanced the state’s interest of protecting children 
from harm.125 The Ninth Circuit upheld the conversion therapy ban under 
a rational basis analysis, reasoning that the law pertained to medical 
conduct rather than speech.126  Notably, in a very recent post-NIFLA 
decision, the Eleventh Circuit subjected a conversion therapy ban to strict 
scrutiny as a content-based regulation and found that it violated the First 
Amendment.127 
Medical Marijuana 
Medical marijuana is legal in many states,128 but doctors who 
prescribe it or advise patients to use it may risk disciplinary action by 
federal authorities, arguably in contravention of their free speech rights.129  
The Ninth Circuit considered a federal policy that established in relevant 
part that a doctor’s recommendation of medical marijuana would lead to 
revocation of his or her registration to prescribe controlled substances.130 
The court found that the content-based restriction impermissibly 
interfered with the free speech rights of physicians.131  By contrast, at least 
one district court held that the First Amendment does not protect 
physician speech surrounding the prescription and recommendation of 
medicinal marijuana.132   
Gun Possession 
In Florida, physicians and medical organizations challenged a law 
that barred doctors and other medical professionals from asking about 
firearm ownership or entering details regarding firearm ownership in a 
patient’s medical chart.133  The Eleventh Circuit found that the content-
                                          
Amendment just because it is spoken by professionals); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
125 King, 767 F.3d at 237-39. 
126 Pickup, 740 F.3d. at 1230. 
127 Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Florida, 981 F.3d 854, 867-68, 872 (11th Cir. 2020).  But see 
Doyle v. Hogan, 411 F.Supp.3d 337, 344-48 (D. MD. 2019) (applying intermediate scrutiny 
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133 Wollschlaeger v. Governor, 848 F.3d 1293, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Florida’s 
Firearms Owners’ Privacy Act (FOPA), codified at Fla. Stat. §§ 790.338, 456.072, 395.1055 
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based law failed to withstand both intermediate and strict scrutiny and 
thus violated plaintiffs’ free speech rights.134  
Abortion 
Not surprisingly, some of the most vigorous First Amendment 
battles relate to speech about reproductive rights.  Likely because of the 
politically charged nature of these cases, court decisions show no 
consistent pattern. 
For example, in recent years, Arkansas135, Idaho136, Kentucky137, 
North Dakota,138 South Dakota139, Oklahoma,140 Nebraska141, and Utah142 
passed laws requiring physicians to tell women that medication abortions 
(using pills) can be reversed, through use of the hormone progesterone 
even though this claim is not supported by scientific evidence.143  Courts 
have temporarily enjoined enforcement of the laws in North Dakota and 
Oklahoma.144 
Other states (fourteen in total) enacted laws mandating that 
clinicians conduct ultrasounds before performing abortions.145  Kentucky’s 
law, requiring that doctors perform an ultrasound and show and describe 
fetal images to a woman prior to an abortion, has been vigorously 
                                          
134 Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1311 (“Because these provisions fail to satisfy heightened 
scrutiny under Sorrell, they obviously would not withstand strict scrutiny.”). 
135 20-16-1703(b) ARK. CODE R. § 9(A). 
136 IDAHO CODE § 18-609(2)(f). 
137 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.774(2) 
138 N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02(11)(b)(5). 
139 KS.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(h). 
140 63 OKLA. STAT. § 1-756 (B). 
141 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-327 (1)(e). 
142 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305.5 (2)(u). 
143 Anna North, Pregnant People are Being Offered an Unproven Treatment to “Reverse” 
Abortions, VOX, https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/11/11/20953337/abortion-pill-
reversal-ohio-bill-law-pregnancy (updated Dec. 6, 2019).   
144 AMA v. Stenehjem, 412 F.Supp. 3d 1134 (N.D. Dist. 2019) (granting preliminary 
injunction to prevent the enforcement of a state law requiring doctors to inform patients 
that the effect of an abortion-inducing drug can be reversed); Tulsa Women’s Reproductive 
Clinic v. Hunter, No. CV-2019-2176 (Okla. Dist. Ct., Okla. County Oct. 29, 2019), available 
at https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=oklahoma&number=CV-
2019-2176&cmid=3813709 (granting a temporary restraining order preventing the 
Oklahoma Attorney General from enforcing the state’s abortion-reversal disclosure law).  
145 Guttmacher Institute, Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTMMACHER.ORG, 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound (current as 
of Dec. 1, 2020). 
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litigated.146  A federal court of appeals upheld the law, and the Supreme 
Court declined to hear the case.147 
South Dakota requires physicians to tell patients, in writing and in 
person, that among the known risks of abortion are an increased likelihood 
of depression, suicidal ideation and suicide.148  Mississippi and Texas 
mandate that doctors advise women that abortions are associated with an 
increased risk of breast cancer.149 Although many experts agree that no  
credible evidence supports any of these claims,150 the Eighth Circuit upheld 
South Dakota’s law.151 
3. FDA Regulation of Non-Clinicians 
Not all First Amendment controversies involve health care 
clinicians. Some have involved entities and professional activities that the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates, and they merit brief 
mention here.152  The FDA regulates drugs, medical devices, and biological 
products.153 The scope of regulation includes matters of professional 
speech, such as drug labeling and advertising.154 
Physicians may prescribe drugs for purposes that the agency has 
not approved, a practice known as off-label use.155  Traditionally, however, 
the FDA has prohibited manufacturers from promoting their drugs for off-
                                          
146 KY. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.727 (2020). 
147 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 424 (6th Cir. 2019) cert. 
denied, EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Meier, 140 S.Ct. 655 (2019).  The court 
explained that: 
Under the First Amendment, we will not highly scrutinize an informed-consent 
statute, including one involving informed consent to an abortion, so long as it 
meets these three requirements: (1) it must relate to a medical procedure; (2) it 
must be truthful and not misleading; and (3) it must be relevant to the patient's 
decision whether to undertake the procedure, which may include, in the abortion 
context, information relevant to the woman's health risks, as well as the impact on 
the unborn life. 
Id. at 428-29.  
148 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(e)(i)-(ii) (West 2016). 
149 MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-41-33(1)(a)(ii) (West 2017); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 
171.012(a)(1)(B)(iii) (West 2015). 
150 Sarah Kramer, Not Your Mouthpiece: Abortion, Ideology, and Compelled Speech in 
Physician-Patient Relationships, 21 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 3-4 (2018). 
151 Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding no First 
Amendment violation because a state could “require a physician to provide truthful, non-
misleading information relevant to a patient's decision to have an abortion”). 
152 U.S. Food & Drug Administration, About FDA, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda (last 
visited January 2, 2021). 
153 U.S. Food & Drug Administration, What We Do, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-
we-do (current as of Mar. 28, 2018). 
154 Kapczynski, supra note 3, at 180, 185. 
155 Claudia E. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 671, 724-25 (2017). 
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label uses.156 Industry advocates have objected that this constraint violates 
manufacturers’ First Amendment rights.157 Following in the footsteps of 
Sorrell, at least a few courts have shown sympathy for this argument.   
In United States v. Caronia, the government prosecuted a drug 
company detailer for promoting a drug approved for narcolepsy for off-label 
uses, including restless leg syndrome, insomnia, and other conditions.158  
The Second Circuit ruled that prosecuting individuals for off-label drug 
promotion violated their First Amendment rights, though the FDA could 
still prohibit companies from making false and misleading statements.159  
Likewise, in Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, a Southern District of New York 
judge granted a company preliminary relief on First Amendment grounds, 
allowing it to market a drug called Vascepa for off-label use..160 
The FDA also regulates certain medical mobile applications and 
digital services.161 One example is 23andMe, which analyzes customers’ 
genetic material (a saliva sample), and provides them with information 
about their ancestry, health, and disease vulnerability.162 Such products 
are often called direct-to-consumer (DTC) tests163 Critics posit that 
regulation of medical mobile applications violates First Amendment free 
                                          
156 Elizabeth Richardson, Off-Label Drug Promotion. Drug Companies Are Largely Prohibited 
from Promoting a Drug for Uses That Have Not Been Approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration, HEALTH POLICY BRIEF (June 30, 2016), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20160630.920075/full/healthpolicybrief
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157 Id. at 4; Peter J. Henning, F.D.A.’s ‘Off-Label’ Drug Policy Leads to Free-Speech Fight, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/business/dealbook/fdas-off-label-drug-policy-
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158 U.S. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 156 (2nd Cir. 2012). 
159 Id. at 160, 168. 
160 Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F.Supp.3d 196, 198 (S.D.N.Y 
2015) (granting the company’s motion for a preliminary injunction and declaring that 
certain marketing statements were truthful and not misleading, despite the FDA’s 
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161 U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Device Software Functions Including Mobile Medical 
Applications (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-health/device-
software-functions-including-mobile-medical-applications.  
162 U.S. Food & Drug Administration, FDA Allows Marketing of First Direct-to-Consumer 
Tests that Provide Genetic Risk Information for Certain Conditions (Apr. 6, 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-allows-marketing-first-
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DNA Insights Are an Essential Part of Your Health Picture, 
https://www.23andme.com/?mkbanner=true (last visited January 2, 2021); Erika Check 
Hayden, The Rise and Fall and Rise Again of 23andMe, NATURE (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://www.nature.com/news/the-rise-and-fall-and-rise-again-of-23andme-1.22801. 
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as of Dec. 20, 2019). 
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speech rights.164 Opponents believe that these applications should not be 
regulated because they simply process information or analyze data derived 
from FDA-approved devices, such as gene sequencers.165 Free speech is at 
issue because arguably such regulation unjustifiably impedes lawful 
commercial speech and deprives consumers of wanted information.166 The 
FDA justifies its regulatory approach by explaining that it oversees only 
DTC tests for “moderate to high risk medical purposes” that could have a 
significant impact on medical care, assessing their analytical validity, 
clinical validity, and the companies’ claims about them.167  The courts have 
not yet had an opportunity to rule on a First Amendment case involving 
DTC tests. 
C. The Future of Free Speech and Professional Regulation 
What does the Supreme Court’s skepticism of speech limitations 
mean for legal and medical regulatory activity in the future? In order to 
consider how best to respond to the regulatory challenges posed by 
technological innovation, it’s necessary first to consider how the Supreme 
Court’s speech jurisprudence affects potential regulatory actions. This 
section analyzes how the Court’s recent case law is likely to affect 
regulatory power over professional speech. It makes three predictions for 
the future of professional licensing. First, speech restrictions are likely to 
be increasingly vulnerable to legal challenges, but licensing itself is 
unlikely to go away any time soon. Second, health-care regulations are 
more likely to be upheld than other professional speech restrictions. Third, 
even if false speech carries constitutional protection, there is still room for 
private litigation based on individual harm caused by such speech. 
1. Speech Restrictions are Vulnerable to Challenge, but Licensing is 
Unlikely to Disappear 
It appears unlikely that the Court will back off its speech-protective 
jurisprudence any time soon. In addition to the cases directly affecting 
professional regulation, the Supreme Court has decided First Amendment 
cases that signal its continuing commitment to place free-speech 
principles over regulatory deference. Ten years ago in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission, the Court recognized corporate free-speech 
rights and relied on the First Amendment to strike down campaign finance 
regulations.168 In doing so, the Court demonstrated an “increasing 
tendency to construe the First Amendment as a shield that private market 
                                          
164 Linnea M. Baudhuin, The FDA and 23andMe: Violating the First Amendment or Protecting 
the Rights, of Consumers? 60 CLIN. CHEMISTRY 835–837 (2014); Adam Candeub, Digital 
Medicine, the FDA, and the First Amendment, 49 GA. L. REV. 933, 968-69 (2015). 
165 Candeub, supra note 164, at 939-40, 971-80. 
166 Baudhuin, supra note 164, at 835. 
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actors can wield against government regulation, rather than (as it once 
did) as a mechanism for safeguarding free speech values against the threat 
posed to them by both private and government power.”169  
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this position recently, when it held 
in a 5-4 decision that public-sector “access fees” charged to employees 
opting out of union membership violated employees’ free-speech rights.170 
In dissent, Justice Kagan sharply criticized the Court for “turning the First 
Amendment into a sword, and using it against workaday economic and 
regulatory policy.”171 She warned that the Court’s free-speech 
jurisprudence—including its decisions in Sorrell and NIFLA—could have 
broad effects that threatened to overwhelm historical regulatory 
approaches.172 She noted that “[s]peech is everywhere” and that “almost all 
economic and regulatory policy affects or touches speech.”173 
Justice Kagan is undoubtedly right that all or nearly all regulatory 
policy affects speech—and this is particularly true for professional 
regulation in the fields of law and medicine. Nonetheless, the Court shows 
no sign of backing off favoring speech over regulation, especially with the 
recent turnover in membership.174  
Furthermore, the areas where most challenges are currently being 
raised in law and medicine would seem to be especially vulnerable under 
the free-speech jurisprudence of the Roberts court. The legal profession’s 
ban on outside investment, for example, has a substantial protectionist 
basis and only a hypothetical public-protection rationale. Under NIFLA, a 
mere hypothetical basis for public protection is likely insufficient to 
support the regulation. If states cannot put forward evidence 
demonstrating that the ban is narrowly tailored to protect against a 
provable harm, the regulation is likely to be deemed unconstitutional. 
Requiring extensive disclaimers regarding attorneys’ marketing speech 
and banning non-lawyer advice on matters touching legal rights are both 
similarly likely to fail under the NIFLA standard—and, to the extent that 
such regulations are adopted by boards comprised predominantly of 
practicing attorneys, may also give rise to antitrust challenges. Speech 
                                          
169 Genevieve Lakier, The First Amendment's Real Lochner Problem, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1241, 
1324 (2020). 
170 Janus v. Am. Fedn. of State, County, and Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 
(2018). 
171 Id. at 2501. 
172 Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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174 Lisa Soronen, SCOTUS and the Seismic Shift: What Might it Mean for States and Local 
Governments?, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES (2020), 
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restrictions are similarly vulnerable on the medical side, as courts going 
forward are unlikely simply to defer to the fact of state regulation. Instead, 
under the Supreme Court’s more restrictive approach, courts will have to 
provide a more searching analysis of both the bases for such regulations 
and the processes by which they were adopted. 
This more searching review will limit the government’s regulatory 
power over the professions, but it will not eliminate it. Wholesale 
abandonment of licensing is extremely unlikely. Even under the high bar 
set by recent Supreme Court cases, the public-protection aspects of 
licensing will likely outweigh the restrictions on liberty they impose.175 The 
speech-restrictive actions taken by licensing entities, however, will have to 
meet a higher standard to be upheld.  
2. Health-Care Speech Restrictions Backed by Sound Evidence Are 
More Likely to Survive 
It’s possible that regulatory actions in the health-care arena will 
more easily satisfy the Supreme Court’s higher bar than actions regulating 
legal practice. Professional speech in the two fields is similar in many 
ways. Both doctors and lawyers are highly trained. And regulation is 
needed to protect vulnerable clients and patients who generally lack “the 
specialized knowledge necessary to effectively evaluate” professional 
advice.176  
But the consequences of harm tend to be greater in medicine than 
in law.177 Bad advice on medical matters is far more likely to lead to 
physical injury or even death, and these consequences cannot be undone 
by financial compensation.178 This may explain, in part, lower courts’ 
efforts to uphold speech-restrictive regulations related to health care.179 We 
are already seeing courts grapple with whether these restrictions are 
consistent with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. The easiest way to 
reconcile these tensions may be to hold that even if a higher standard of 
scrutiny applies, health-care regulations will survive a high level of 
                                          
175 See Claudia E. Haupt, Licensing Knowledge, 72 VAND. L. REV. 501, 559 (2019) (‘The First 
Amendment, it turns out, is a poor vehicle to challenge professional licensing regimes.”). 
176 Cassandra Burke Robertson, How Should We License Lawyers?, 89 FORDHAM L. REV.__ 
(forthcoming 2021). 
177 Miller & Berkman, supra note 36, at 654 (recommending tying physician speech 
protection to patient safety, and arguing that “[p]hysician speech is professional speech--
not medical conduct--when treating it as such promotes patient safety, occurs within the 
confines of a doctor-patient relationship, and is supported by evidence-based medicine”).  
178 See Jane R. Bambauer, Snake Oil Speech, 93 WASH. L. REV. 73, 83 (2018) (“If claims that 
are very likely to be false are also likely to cause harm, the state can intervene on behalf of 
public safety without imposing a singular and authoritative definition of truth.”). 
179 See supra Part III.B. 
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scrutiny as long as they are backed by an evidentiary record showing a 
positive effect on patient protection.180 
At the same time, requiring an evidentiary record to uphold speech 
restrictions would likely mean striking down some current speech 
regulations. As discussed above, health care has sometimes been the 
target of both compelled and forbidden speech mandates that are highly 
politicized.181 Courts upholding such regulations have broadly deferred to 
legislative actions.182 If heightened scrutiny is applied, regulations that 
amount to “an attempt to skew the marketplace of ideas or invade the 
buffer of confidentiality and autonomy that protects the integrity of the 
professional-client relationship” are likely to fail.183 Regulations backed  by 
an evidentiary record, however, are more likely to survive.184 In this way, 
heightened scrutiny actually increases courts’ ability to engage in quality 
control and weed out requirements that are merely political.185  
3. Private Litigation May Play a Role in Protecting Against False and 
Harmful Professional Speech 
What happens if legal or medical professionals engage in false 
speech? To the extent that speech protection puts governmental regulation 
at risk, it is possible that private law—and especially litigation—may play 
a larger role in enforcing standards of professional care.186 Having a right 
                                          
180 See Miller & Berkman, supra note 36 at 654 (noting that “there remain definitional 
questions about how promotion of patient safety ought to be quantified, how a doctor-
patient relationship ought to be recognized, and how much evidence (and of what type) 
demonstrates evidence-based medicine). 
181 See supra Part III.B. See also Sarah C. Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment, 94 IND. 
L.J. 1351, 1406 (2019) (“in some cases, the State might use (and has used) compelled 
speech to force speakers to affirm an ideological viewpoint.”). 
182 E.g., Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1230 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is well recognized that 
a state enjoys considerable latitude to regulate the conduct of its licensed health care 
professionals in administering treatment.”). 
183 Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 
67, 112 (2016). 
184 Jane R. Bambauer, The Empirical First Amendment, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 960 (2017) 
(“[E]mpirical studies and data can help improve the state's selection of political priorities 
and the efficacy of its political solutions.”). 
185 Of course, some regulations may have both an evidentiary basis and a political bent. 
Politicization by itself is not a reason to strike down regulations affecting speech. See Robert 
Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 910 (2015) (“Nor should 
mandated factual disclosures become constitutionally disfavored because they occur in 
circumstances of acrimonious political controversy. The need for sober factual disclosures 
might be most urgent in the context of socially contested issues like tobacco or obesity.”). 
186 Haupt, supra note 175 (suggesting that “foregrounding of the relevant private common 
law” would protect against the risk of limiting regulation in areas such as “food labeling 
requirements, most securities disclosures, professional responsibility rules for lawyers, 
rules concerning doctor-patient confidentiality, and a host of other safety-based 
regulations”). Couldn’t find the quote within the document referred to (was looking for the 
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to engage in speech, after all, does not insulate professionals from 
malpractice liability for harms caused when that speech amounts to fraud, 
negligence, or ineptitude. It is true that taken to its logical extreme, free-
speech principles could protect even negligent or fraudulent speech if 
professional speech no longer has a categorical exclusion from First 
Amendment protection.187 But even the elimination of a categorical 
exclusion does not result in absolute protection for all speech—it merely 
requires a higher level of scrutiny.188  
The Supreme Court protects even blatantly untruthful speech on 
First Amendment grounds in some circumstances.  In U.S. v. Alvarez, the 
Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act.189 The government had argued 
that criminal prosecution for lying about military honors was allowable 
because the First Amendment did not protect false speech.190 The 
government pointed to defamation liability and fraud liability as 
demonstrating that false speech could render an individual civilly and 
criminally liable. The Supreme Court  held that false speech was not 
categorially excluded from the First Amendment, but rather that legal 
limits on false speech may be more likely to survive heightened scrutiny.191 
The Court explained that there must be a “direct causal link between the 
restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”192 When the speech is 
diffuse and public-directed, as with lying generally about military honors, 
the Court concluded that counterspeech should generally “suffice to 
achieve [the government’s] interest.”193  
The Court may be wrong about whether government speech will 
suffice to protect the public interest in the face of false statements.194 
                                          
187 Amanda Shanor, Business Licensing and Constitutional Liberty, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 
314, 320–21 (2016) (“If the “speaking” nature of a profession were sufficient to trigger 
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188 Thus, for example, a First Amendment challenge to a Florida restriction on personal 
fundraising by judges failed; the Court applied heightened scrutiny, but nevertheless 
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575 U.S. 433, 455 (2015). 
189 U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
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Nonetheless, the Alvarez opinion makes it clear that even false statements 
will have constitutional protection. It is only when the risks created by 
professional speech are high enough that restrictions will survive strict 
scrutiny.195  
Constitutional protection for false speech, however, does not mean that 
professionals cannot be subject to liability for fraud or malpractice. The 
harms caused by fraud and malpractice are almost certainly distinct and 
concrete enough to allow the claims to survive heightened scrutiny.196 
Applying strict scrutiny to professional speech does not insulate such 
speech from liability. Instead, constitutional analysis is aimed only at 
“filtering out government regulation that is not, in the classic sense, 
targeted at preventing criminal, tortious, or palpably unethical 
professional conduct.”197 But private lawsuits seeking compensation for 
provable harm are likely to pass even a test of strict scrutiny. 
IV. PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION AT SCALE 
The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence heightening speech 
protection has created a regulatory challenge for states. If the shift toward 
greater protection for professional speech had happened twenty or thirty 
years ago, it probably would have been relatively simple to reach a new 
regulatory equilibrium by backing off of some of the more protectionist 
restrictions and building a stronger evidentiary record to support the 
regulations that play a key role in protecting the public. Today, however, 
it is more difficult to reach a new regulatory equilibrium because 
technological advances—and in particular, massive digital platforms—
have changed the scale of professional influence and therefore changed 
the entire regulatory context.198  
What does it mean to regulate at scale? Professor Paul Ohm has 
described the effect of “massive digital platforms” that affect the 
                                          
somebody who is literally defined by thinking that everyone and everything is a lie and 
against them and a conspiracy?"). 
195 Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26 (2010) (upholding restrictions on 
attorney speech imposed by a “statute [that] is carefully drawn to cover only a narrow 
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196 See John S. Ehrett, Speak No Evil, Do No Harm: A New Legal Standard for Professional 
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harm-based analysis, “a vast swath of occupational licensing laws . . . that would otherwise 
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197 Smolla, supra note 182, at 112. 
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“mathematics of regulation.”199 He explains that law tends to work linearly, 
while the “power and harm of online activity” grow at a much faster rate, 
thus creating a situation in which regulatory policy fails to keep up with 
its underlying goal of public protection.200 He points to the following:  1) the 
ability of digital platforms to facilitate cross-border communication even 
as regulatory authority remains jurisdictionally-bound, 2) the ability of a 
single communication to achieve a much larger scale of influence, 
potentially “touch[ing] the lives of billions,” and 3) the growth of artificial 
intelligence (AI) programs that may come with unexpected externalities.201 
These problems of regulatory scale affect regulatory policy in both 
law and health care. Traditionally, professional speech occurred on an 
individual basis: a doctor talking to a patient or a lawyer talking to a client. 
Professional regulation accordingly relied primarily on licensing, 
discipline, and exclusion from the profession to maintain quality and 
safety standards. Thus, regulatory bodies licensed individuals qualified to 
render advice, disciplined those whose advice breached the professional 
standard of care, and excluded non-professionals from engaging in 
conduct within the regulatory sphere. Of course, even under the 
traditional approach, there have always been some questions at the 
margin that didn’t fit well in the traditional regulatory scheme: Does a 
bank that helps a client set up a trust engage in the unauthorized practice 
of law? Does an herbalist who recommends dietary supplements to 
individuals engage in unlicensed medical practice?202 But even though 
these kinds of edge-cases received media attention and were the subject of 
academic discussion, they were rare enough that they did not upend the 
traditional structure of professional regulation that focused on individual 
qualifications and one-to-one communications. 
The scale of modern mass communication offers a much larger 
threat to the viability of traditional regulatory approaches. Online forums 
such as Reddit’s “legal advice” board allow individuals to pose questions 
about their legal rights and remedies and to receive near-instantaneous 
responses from around the globe, both from lawyers and laypeople. In the 
medical sphere,  Icliniq.com provides an “Ask a Doctor Online” service 
through which users enter their health queries,  create an account, and 
receive medical advice from a doctor.203  Sibly is an employee wellness app 
                                          
199 Id. at 546. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 548–52. 
202 At least one state has upheld a criminal conviction for practicing medicine without a 
license under this scenario. State v. Miller, 542 N.W.2d 241, 246-47 (Iowa 1995). 
203 iCliniq, Ask a Doctor Online, https://www.iccliniq.com/ask-a-doctor-online (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2020).  iCliniq.com states that its “doctor panel consists of medical practitioners, 
physicians and therapists from US, UK, UAE, India, Singapore, Germany and counting,”  
About iCliniq, ICLINIQ.COM, https://www.icliniq.com/p/aboutus (last visited Nov. 17, 2020). 
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that connects individuals to “helpful human coaches,”204 individuals who 
are “trained in active listening, motivational interviewing, cognitive 
behavioral tools and mindfulness models of change.”205  
As a result of the challenge posed by massive digital platforms, 
merely rebalancing the regulatory equilibrium will not go far enough to 
meet the needs of public protection today. Instead, effective professional 
regulation requires rethinking both the goals and methods of professional 
regulation—and requires doing so within the speech-protective framework 
adopted by the Supreme Court. This section examines the regulatory 
challenges posed by modern technology. It begins with an analysis of 
health care and medical practice, as this area is more comprehensively 
regulated than legal practice.  It examines the regulatory challenges posed 
by telemedicine, artificial intelligence (AI) and the diffusion of false and 
unreliable health information through social media. It then turns to the 
field of legal practice, assessing how technology has a similar effect on legal 
practice as it collapses geographic boundaries, enables mass 
communication, and creates both opportunities and risks with the 
integration of AI. 
A. Health Care and Technology 
Technology has changed the practice of medicine in profound ways.  
It has enabled health care providers to reach far beyond their local offices 
and to broaden their capabilities.  However, technology also comes with 
risks and shortcomings that require careful regulatory responses.   
This part will address three areas of technology-enabled medical 
practice:  telemedicine, artificial intelligence, and communication through 
social media. 
1. Telemedicine 
Telemedicine is “the diagnosis and treatment of patients through 
telecommunications technology” such as smartphones, tablets, and 
computers.206  Telemedicine is a subset of telehealth, which also includes 
remote patient monitoring, remote communication among clinicians, and 
other activities.207 
                                          
204 Sibly, https://www.sibly.com/ (last visited Nov. 17,2020). 
205 General Questions: Who Are Sibly Coaches? https://www.sibly.com/faqs (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2020), Sibly’s terms of use explicitly state that “Sibly only provides an online 
platform to connect users with coaches for one-on-one digital interfacing.  Sibly Coaches 
are not authorized to provide services requiring professional licensure (e.g. psychotherapy 
or psychiatry.” In addition, Sibly asserts that it cannot guarantee the “competence of any 
Sibly coach.”  Sibly Terms of Use, SIBLY.COM, https://www.sibly.com/terms-of-use (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2020). 
206 Medscape, What Is Telemedicine? 
https://www.medscape.com/courses/section/921359 (last visited Dec. 29, 2020). 
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There are two types of telemedicine.  The first is synchronous, or 
real-time video encounters between patients and clinicians.208  Some real-
time visits take place in medical offices so that a nurse or other assistant 
can engage in hands-on assessment, such as taking blood pressure or 
placing a stethoscope on the patient.209 The second form of telemedicine is 
asynchronous, or “store-and-forward” communication.210  Here, health 
care providers gather information about the patient, including the 
patient’s narrative, lab results, images, videos, and medical records, and 
send it securely online for analysis by another party, such as a 
specialist.211  The patient then receives a diagnosis and treatment plan.212   
Store-and-forward is often used for dermatology, pathology, and radiology 
services.213  
Experts estimate that in 2019, thirty percent of doctors and over 
fifty percent of hospitals had access to telemedicine.214  In 2020, during 
the COVID-19 pandemic, telemedicine use grew dramatically.215  This 
option enabled patients to consult health care providers while remaining 
socially isolated in the safety of their own homes.216 
                                          
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id.; Eric Wicklund, Store-and-Forward Telemedicine Services Expand Connected Health, 
MHEALTH INTELLIGENCE, https://mhealthintelligence.com/features/store-and-forward-
telemedicine-services-expand-connected-health (last visited Dec. 29, 2020). 
211 Medscape, supra note 206; Wicklund, supra note 210. 
212 Medscape, supra note 206; Wicklund, supra note 210. 
213 Medscape, supra note 206. 
214 Id. 
215 COVID-19 and the Rise of Telemedicine, THE MEDICAL FUTURIST (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://medicalfuturist.com/covid-19-was-needed-for-telemedicine-to-finally-go-
mainstream/; Research Shows Patients and Clinicians Rated Telemedicine Care Positively 
During COVID-19 Pandemic, PENN MED. NEWS (June 24, 2020), 
https://www.pennmedicine.org/news/news-releases/2020/june/patients-and-
clinicians-rated-telemedicine-care-positively-during-covid (reporting on a survey that 
found that at Penn Medicine, “[i]n one week, … [the] gastroenterology and hepatology 
practice went from doing roughly 5 percent of … visits per week with telemedicine to 94 
percent”).  
216 Alicia Adamczyk, Can’t See Your Doctor in Person? Take Advantage of Your Telemedicine 
Options, CNBC.COM (May 6, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/06/why-you-should-
take-advantage-of-your-telemedicine-options.html.  




Telemedicine has many potential benefits.217  Telemedicine care can 
be as effective as in-person care in many cases.218  A Massachusetts 
General Hospital study found that among established patients, “[m]ost 
patients (62.6%) and clinicians (59.0%) reported ‘no difference’ between 
virtual and office visits on ‘the overall quality of the visit.’”219  A different 
study focused on telemedicine in intensive care units that enables off-site 
critical care experts to support patient care.220 The study found that 
telemedicine “may reduce ICU mortality, hospital mortality, and lengths of 
ICU stays” though not the overall length of hospital stays.221    
In addition, telemedicine appointments can be very convenient for 
patients, sparing them the need to travel to medical facilities and take 
extended time off from work or find childcare coverage.222  Consequently, 
patients may receive more continuous medical oversight and avoid care 
disruptions.223 Telemedicine can also be less expensive than in-person 
visits.224 According to one study, telemedicine visits on average cost $79, 
                                          
217 Zawn Villines, Telemedicine Benefits: For Patients and Professionals, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY 
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/telemedicine-benefits. 
218 Id.; Joel E. Barthelemy, Virtual Care vs. In-Person Visits: Which is Higher Quality? 
GLOBALMED (July 15, 2019), https://www.globalmed.com/telemedicine-vs-in-person-
visits-which-is-higher-quality/.  
219 Karen Donelan et al., Patient and Clinician Experiences with Telehealth for Patient Follow-
up Care, 25 AM. J. MANAG. CARE 40, 42 (2019).  
220 Jing Chen et al., Clinical and Economic Outcomes of Telemedicine Programs in the 
Intensive Care Unit: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 33 J. INTENSIVE CARE MED. 383, 
384 (2018).   
221 Id. at 391.  See also, Astrid Buvik et al., Patient Reported Outcomes with Remote 
Orthopaedic Consultations by Telemedicine: A Randomised Controlled Trial, 25 J. 
TELEMEDICINE & TELECARE 451, 451 (2019) (“We did not observe any difference in patient-
reported satisfaction and health … between video-assisted and standard consultations”);  
Khidir Dalouk et al., Outcomes of Telemedicine Video-Conference Clinic Versus In-Person 
Clinic Follow-Up for Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator Recipients, 10 CIRCULATION: 
ARRYTHMIA & ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY (2017), 
https://www.ahajournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1161/CIRCEP.117.005217 (finding that 
outcomes for patients who received follow-up care by videoconferencing were “noninferior” 
to outcomes for those receiving in-person follow-up); Jessica F. Robb et al., Comparison of 
Telemedicine Versus In-Person Visits for Persons with Multiple Sclerosis: A Randomized 
Crossover Study of Feasibility, Cost, and Satisfaction, 36 MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS (2019), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.msard.2019.05.001 (reporting that 97.1% of patients would 
recommend televisits to others, and 94.3% of patients found it easy to connect with their 
provider via telemedicine). 
222 Donelan et al., supra note 219, at 40. 
223 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Using Telehealth to Expand Access to 
Essential Health Services During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/telehealth.html (updated June 10, 
2020). 
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while in-person office visits cost $146.225  These benefits can be of 
particular value to members of vulnerable populations that face access 
barriers, such as the elderly, people with disabilities, or economically 
disadvantaged individuals.226 
Telemedicine can be beneficial for providers as well.  If they do a 
significant portion of their work through telemedicine, they may be able to 
cut costs by renting smaller office spaces and paying for less 
administrative assistance.227  In addition, they may be able to serve more 
patients and supplement their incomes, and during COVID-19, 
telemedicine enabled clinicians to reduce their risk of infection by avoiding 
in-person contact with patients.228 
At the same time, telemedicine has several risks and limitations.  In 
some cases, it is more appropriate to examine a patient face-to-face, and 
pursuing a virtual consultation could delay urgently needed care or even 
lead to a misdiagnosis.229  In addition, both the clinician and the patient 
must be sufficiently adept with technology to avoid glitches, and, 
depending on the medical problem, the patient may need to have a space 
at home in which to conduct the visit privately.230 Other privacy concerns 
may arise if the technology does not meet state-of-the art security 
standards and is thus vulnerable to hacking.231  Finally, clinicians and 
patients wishing to use telemedicine often face a variety of regulatory 
barriers. 
Telemedicine Regulation 
Extensive regulations govern telemedicine.232  While technology 
theoretically should enable clinicians to render services throughout the 
                                          
225 J. Scott Ashwood et al., Direct-To-Consumer Telehealth May Increase Access to Care but 
Does Not Decrease Spending, 36 HEALTH AFF. 485, 488 (2017) (concluding that because of 
its convenience, telehealth increases utilization of medical services and therefore raises 
overall health-care spending). 
226 Villines, supra note 217. 
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229 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 223. 
230 Id. 
231 Villines, supra note 217. 
232 See generally, CENTER FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POLICY, STATE TELEHEALTH LAWS & 
REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES (Fall 2019), https://www.cchpca.org/sites/default/files/2019-
10/50%20State%20Telehalth%20Laws%20and%20Reibmursement%20Policies%20Repor
t%20Fall%202019%20FINAL.pdf; Federation of State Medical Boards, Telemedicine Policies 
Board by Board Overview, https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/key-
issues/telemedicine_policies_by_state.pdf (last updated July 2020); Christian D. Becker et 
al., Legal Perspectives on Telemedicine Part 1:  Legal and Regulatory Issues, 23 PERMANENTE 
J. 18-293 (2019), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6636526/pdf/18-
293.pdf.  
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United States, they are often severely constrained by federal and state 
laws.  Nevertheless, telemedicine regulations demonstrate the ability of the 
state and federal governments to accommodate changing demands and 
circumstances in the health care arena.  
One heavily regulated area is licensure. Ordinarily, physicians must 
be licensed in each state in which they practice medicine, and this 
principle is no different for telemedicine.233  This means that physicians 
must be licensed in the state in which their patients are located.234  
However, licensing policies have become somewhat more lenient in many 
states. 
Nine states issue special licenses or certificates that allow out-of-
state clinicians to provide telemedicine services in the state, and several 
others permit the practice of medicine across state lines under certain 
circumstances (without specifically mentioning telemedicine).235     
Twenty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and Guam are 
members of the Federation of State Medical Boards’ Interstate Medical 
Licensure Compact (IMLC).236  The compact creates an expedited process 
by which licensed physicians can obtain licenses in other states.237  Note 
that the IMLC relaxes telemedicine barriers but does not remove them 
entirely because physicians still need to obtain licensure in new states, 
and not all states are IMLC members.   
Three additional compacts facilitate licensure in multiple states.238  
The Nurses Licensure Compact (with 34 member states) allows nurses to 
serve in other states without obtaining additional licenses.239 The Physical 
Therapy Compact (with 20 member states) allows eligible physical 
therapists and physical therapy assistants to purchase compact privilege 
                                          
233 Federation of State Medical Boards, supra note 232; Kocher, supra note 110.  See e.g., 
OH REV. CODE § 4731.41(A) (2019) (“No person shall practice medicine and surgery, or any 
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234 Becker et al., supra note 232. 
235 CENTER FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POLICY, supra note 232, at 9; Federation of State Medical 
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in member states and work without obtaining new licenses.240  The 
Psychology Interjurisdictional Compact (with 15 member states) allows 
psychologists licensed in member states to provide telepsychology services 
or temporary in-person services in member states.241   
Patients’ ability to obtain insurance coverage for telemedicine is 
another area that is subject to regulation. Without insurance payments, 
patients and clinicians are unlikely to use telemedicine.  Forty states and 
the District of Columbia have laws that address private insurers’ 
reimbursement for telemedicine services.242  However, only a few require 
that private insurers pay equally for in-person and telemedicine 
services.243 
The United States’ primary public insurance programs, Medicaid 
and Medicare, have also considered payment for telemedicine.244 Under the 
Medicaid program, all states and the District of Columbia pay for some 
forms of live video telemedicine.245  However, only fourteen states 
reimburse for store-and-forward.246  Medicare provides reimbursement for 
telemedicine using an “interactive 2-way telecommunications system” in 
limited circumstances, but it does not pay for store-and-forward 
services.247   
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Regulations regarding online prescribing also vary, with some states 
embracing a more permissive approach than others.248  Most states 
prohibit clinicians from writing prescriptions based exclusively on 
patients’ answers to online questionnaires.249  Some states do not address 
online prescribing, but many allow clinicians to conduct exams by 
telemedicine for prescribing purposes.250   
Some states do not authorize doctors who see patients only 
remotely to prescribe controlled substances, but an increasing number 
allow such prescriptions.251  The latter states have liberalized their laws in 
response to the opioid crisis so that telemedicine clinicians can provide 
medications such as methadone to treat opioid addiction.252 
2. Artificial Intelligence 
“Artificial intelligence,” (AI) refers to a computer’s ability to imitate human 
behavior and learn.253  Computers learn with the help of algorithms. An 
algorithm is a “computational procedure that takes some value, or set of 
values, as input and produces some value, or set of values, as output.”254  
It is thus “a sequence of computational steps that transform the input into 
the output.”255  Health care providers may rely on AI to assist them in 
making decisions or to be a substitute decision maker.256 Clinicians may 
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input data about a patient’s symptoms, medical history, and personal 
details and obtain a suggested diagnosis and treatment plan as the AI 
output.257 
A well-known type of AI is machine learning, which enables computers 
to “automatically detect patterns in data, and then use the uncovered 
patterns to predict future data or to perform decision-making tasks under 
uncertainty.”258  Scientists prepare machine learning algorithms to engage 
in analysis by using training data.259  For example, developers might show 
a learning algorithm numerous tumor images with indications as to 
whether they are cancerous.260  The algorithm should then learn to 
distinguish between benign and malignant growths when it sees new 
images.261   
Some machine learning algorithms are trained only once and are 
considered “locked,” providing the same results each time they are given 
the same inputs.262 Others continuously learn and adapt so the outputs 
they generate for specific inputs may change over time. 263  
                                          
257 Mayo Clinic, AI System Works with Physicians to Identify the Most Helpful Treatments for 
People Diagnosed with Depression (Feb. 17, 2020), 
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Many algorithms are commonly used by physicians and thus influence 
the treatment of numerous patients.264  They are thus becoming an 
important component of professional medical speech. 
AI Benefits and Limitations  
AI can allow clinicians to analyze very large data sets quickly and 
efficiently so that they can potentially deliver better health care less 
expensively.265  AI can do some of the analytical work that paid staff would 
otherwise do and can accomplish it more quickly and efficiently.266  AI can 
also improve the quality of medical care.267  Learning algorithms can help 
doctors determine which patients will respond well to different therapies 
so that they can tailor their treatments accordingly.268  AI may also help 
identify individuals at high risk of contracting particular diseases so that 
doctors can screen them regularly.269 
AI is also being harnessed to combat COVID-19.270  For example, 
researchers are working to develop AI tools to predict which children will 
suffer severe COVID-19 symptoms.271  Likewise, algorithms have been 
trained to analyze computed tomography (CT) scans and identify COVID-
19-related pneumonia.272  
Medical AI, however, is not devoid of hazards.  First, AI can be flawed 
and provide incorrect information or advice to doctors, leading to improper 
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treatment choices.273  Learning algorithms can be poorly designed or 
implemented.  Moreover, the training data that is used to develop 
algorithms may contain serious data errors or gaps.274  
AI critics worry not only about medical mistakes, but also about 
algorithmic bias.275 Algorithmic bias can lead to discrimination that 
disadvantages particular groups.276 Bias can be rooted in the absence of 
appropriate diversity in training data.277  For example, if the training data 
come from a health system that serves primarily white and wealthy 
patients, the algorithm may not be generalizable to other patients.278  It 
might thus work well for privileged white patients but make mistakes with 
respect to others.  
To illustrate, an algorithm used to refer patients with chronic disease 
to high-risk care management programs favored Whites over sicker 
African-Americans.279 It used past medical expenditures as a proxy for 
medical needs and interpreted low spending as indicating that an 
individual is healthy.280  While this might be true for many people, health 
care access barriers such as poverty and lack of insurance often prevent 
African-Americans from pursuing adequate medical care.281  The algorithm 
failed to take this into account and exacerbated the problem by also 
excluding African Americans from beneficial disease management 
programs.282 
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In addition, training data may capture existing inequities, causing the 
trained algorithm to perpetuate discrimination.283  For example, women 
have been found to be less likely than men to receive lipid-lowering drugs, 
in-hospital procedures, and proper care at hospital discharge despite 
being more likely to have high blood pressure and heart failure.284  
Algorithms developed from training data that reflect such under-treatment 
will likely learn to recommend less intensive care for women than men 
even though this approach is inappropriate.285  
AI Regulation 
The Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) approach to regulating AI 
is currently uncertain and evolving.286 The agency acknowledges that its 
“traditional paradigm of medical device regulation was not designed for 
adaptive artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies.”287  
The FDA generally does not extend its reach to algorithms that are 
developed and used in-house by health-care providers.288 It does intend to 
regulate certain types of software, such as software that analyzes 
“physiological signals” for purposes of diagnosis or treatment.289 To that 
end, the FDA has approved many algorithms used in the fields of radiology, 
cardiology, and internal medicine.290 The FDA also intends to scrutinize AI 
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tools that are opaque and do not enable clinicians to understand the basis 
of recommendations, sometimes called black-box algorithms.291   
The agency has thus far focused its regulatory efforts on locked 
algorithms.292  In 2019, it published a discussion paper detailing its 
“foundation for a potential approach to premarket review for artificial 
intelligence and machine learning-driven software modifications.”293  But 
the FDA has taken no further action to promulgate regulations for adaptive 
AI.294   
Congress has also shown interest in the issue of AI integrity.  In 2019 
Senators Cory Booker (D-NJ) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Representative 
Yvette Clarke (D-NY) introduced a bill called the “Algorithmic 
Accountability Act.”295 
 
The bill would do the following: 
 Authorize the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to require covered 
entities to conduct impact assessments of any highly sensitive 
automated decision systems.  
 Require covered entities to evaluate their automated decision 
systems and associated training data in order to identify problems 
in the areas of accuracy, fairness, bias, discrimination, privacy and 
security. 
 Require covered entities to assess their information systems’ ability 
to protect data subjects’ privacy and safeguard data security. 
 Require covered entities to resolve identified problems.296 
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The proposed Algorithmic Accountability Act was subject to a variety of 
criticisms and did not become law.297  However, legislative action may be 
more successful in the future and is an additional path to establish 
algorithmic oversight and promote AI fairness. 
3. Propagation of False Information 
Technology enables individuals to reach almost limitless audiences and 
to convey information nationally and internationally.  This includes 
information that is incorrect and even harmful.298  For example, in July of 
2020 a video of doctors making false claims about COVID-19 went viral 
after it was shared on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.299  In the video, 
one doctor asserted that hydroxychloroquine, zinc, and Zithromax were a 
cure for the pandemic, rendering masks unnecessary.300  Another argued 
that lockdowns did not significantly decrease COVID-19 death rates.301 In 
a different video, Dr. Annie Bukacek claimed that death certificates were 
wrongly attributing deaths to COVID-19.302  In yet another viral video, 
virologist Judy Mikovits falsely asserted that the number of COVID-19 
deaths was inflated, that the virus was activated by face masks, and that 
Dr. Anthony Fauci was responsible for the deaths of millions of HIV/AIDS 
patients in the 1980s.303   
 
B. Legal Advice and Technology 
The rise of digital platforms has had three primary effects in the 
practice of law. First, it has made it easier for legal practice to cross state 
and even national boundaries. Second, it enables communication about 
legal matters to extend far beyond the traditional lawyer-client 
relationship. Finally, it has enabled the growth of AI systems that affect 
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legal practice in ways that change the norms, expectations, and effects of 
legal work. This subsection explores how each of those changes in the 
scale of legal practice shapes the scope and results of regulatory policy. 
1. Illusory Geographic Boundaries 
The practice of law is regulated at the state level.304 But with modern 
technology, state borders have little relevance to daily practice—lawyers 
can often do their work from anywhere, meeting virtually with clients and 
negotiating deals and settlements through email or video conferencing. 
Unlike telemedicine, which is regulated extensively, there is little direct 
regulation of virtual lawyering—instead, virtual and cross-border practice 
is regulated largely through the application of regulations on the 
unauthorized practice of law, which is often not a perfect fit.305  
 The gap between regulatory standards and common practice is 
growing. From the standpoint of a reasonable lawyer, there is no reason 
why a lawyer with expertise in a practice area shouldn’t assist clients in 
need of that expertise even when the lawyer and client reside in different 
states. Research also shows that regulatory overreach in UPL enforcement 
negatively affects access to justice.306 
But when a lawyer in Colorado tried to help his in-laws in 
Minnesota negotiate a debt-collection action, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that the Colorado lawyer had engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law.307 The attorney hadn’t charged his in-laws a fee, hadn’t 
claimed to be licensed in Minnesota, hadn’t appeared in a Minnesota court, 
and hadn’t practiced beyond his level of competence. Nonetheless, the 
court held that by attempting to negotiate a debt for Minnesota residents 
against a Minnesota creditor in a dispute arising under Minnesota law, the 
lawyer had engaged in the practice of law “in Minnesota.”308 Because the 
lawyer was licensed only in Colorado, the court upheld the admonition 
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imposed by the disciplinary panel.309 One dissenting judge would have 
interpreted state law to find representation to be “reasonably related” to 
the lawyer’s Colorado practice and therefore allowed under Minnesota 
law.310 Neither the majority nor the dissent grappled with the 
constitutionality of restricting cross-border speech. 
 The question of cross-border practice was also raised in Ohio when 
Kentucky-licensed attorney Alice Auclair Jones applied for admission to 
the Ohio bar. Jones originally lived, worked, and was licensed in Kentucky. 
She worked for a firm that had offices in both Kentucky and Cincinnati. 
After getting married, she moved to Cincinnati where she continued to 
work for the firm representing her Kentucky-based clients while she 
applied for admission to the Ohio bar.311 Jones was careful to work 
exclusively  on matters “before Kentucky tribunals arising under Kentucky 
law” and avoid working on any matters arising under Ohio law, affecting 
Ohio clients, or coming before Ohio  courts.312 She did not hold herself out 
as an Ohio-licensed attorney, and continued to use letterhead with contact 
information for the firm’s Kentucky office.313 Nonetheless, the Ohio Board 
of Commissioners on Character and Fitness recommended that her 
admission to the Ohio bar be denied, concluding that her physical 
presence in Ohio while her application was pending amounted to the 
unauthorized practice of law in Ohio.314  
 The matter went up to the Ohio Supreme Court with substantial 
amicus participation from national law firms. The court ultimately ruled 
that Jones could be admitted to practice in Ohio, holding that her pre-
admission presence in Ohio could be deemed “temporary” because she had 
applied for admission and that the practice therefore was not 
“unauthorized” under Ohio law.315  While the majority did not need to reach 
the question of whether the result was constitutionally mandated, a 
concurring opinion did address the constitutional issues.  
The concurring justices acknowledged that technology had outpaced 
regulation, stating that “before the advent of the Internet, electronic 
communication, and the like, a lawyer who worked in Ohio was almost 
always practicing Ohio law,” but that now it was easy for an attorney to 
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physically reside in the state while practicing outside of it.316 The 
concurring justices would have held that the state had no interest in 
regulating the legal practice of “a lawyer who is not practicing Ohio law or 
appearing in Ohio courts.”317 The concurring justices pointed to instances 
in which lawyers might practice across a state border but maintain “a 
secondary office inside their homes so that they can access their files 
remotely” or might live and practice elsewhere but keep an “Ohio vacation 
home on Lake Erie” in which they spend summers. Under the majority 
opinion, such attorneys would still be required to seek licensure in Ohio. 
Under the concurring opinion, however, the state would have no interest 
in regulating this practice and could not constitutionally forbid it. 
2. One-to-Many and Many-to-Many Communication 
In addition to more commonly crossing geographic boundaries, the 
provision of legal advice has also expanded beyond the traditional client-
lawyer relationship. The growth of massive digital platforms has changed 
the scale of communication about legal information. This has meant that 
more information about legal matters is available directly to the public 
even without legal representation. As Professor Robert Kry has pointed 
out, “technological advances have enabled clients to access a wealth of 
advice with minimal time and expense.”318 Greater accessibility of 
information means both that a single expert can more easily reach a broad 
audience (one-to-many communication) and that groups of people can 
more easily collaborate (crowdsourcing, or many-to-many 
communication).319  
Both of these communication patterns have implications for the 
regulation of legal practice. The ability to communicate with a large 
audience fuels companies such as LegalZoom and others that provide 
routine legal forms and non-specialized advice on  “simple document 
preparation, such as wills, incorporation documents, and name-change 
petitions” to a broad audience.320 The ability to crowdsource legal 
information has led to new forums popping up online, providing legal 
advice for people who may not be able to afford to hire lawyers or may not 
trust their own lawyer’s advice.321  
                                          
316 Id. at 886 (DeWine, J., concurring). 
317 Id. 
318 Kry, supra note 61, at 975. 
319 Derek E. Bambauer, The MacGuffin and the Net: Taking Internet Listeners Seriously, 90 
U. COLO. L. REV. 475, 477 (2019) (explaining that the internet is “the first widespread 
medium to make communication by many speakers and many listeners--one-to-one and 
one-to-many, simultaneous and asynchronous--not only possible but routine,” and that it 
“makes many-to-many communication seamless”). 
320 Robertson, supra note 77, at 87. 
321 Id. at 83-86. 
50  55 UC DAVIS L.REV. (forthcoming 2022). 1/1/21 
 
 
Crowdsourced advice is not always good advice, of course, as 
“[l]awyers who quickly dispense advice do not have time to fully investigate 
the facts,” while “non-lawyers may lack information both about the facts 
and the law.”322 Nonetheless, forums such as Reddit’s r/legaladvice are 
increasingly active. The Reddit forum alone has over 1.4 million members 
and enables individuals to seek advice on matters such as how to obtain 
embassy assistance in returning a minor citizen to the United States,323 
whether a tenant could be evicted for non-payment,324 and whether a 
sibling’s drug addiction would provide grounds for an individual to seek 
custody of the sibling’s child.325 It’s true that crowdsourcing isn’t the best 
way to handle important legal matters. But legal representation is often 
financially out of reach even for relatively well-off Americans, so seeking 
advice online may be the most accessible source of information about the 
law for many people.326  
 Crowdsourced advice doesn’t just cover the substance of legal 
matters. Instead, it can also serve as a way of monitoring lawyer quality. 
Just as online reviews have cropped up for everything from restaurants to 
cookbooks, they have also become a major source of information for 
individuals seeking to hire an attorney.327 Over the last twenty years, 
prospective clients increasingly rely on Internet searches rather than 
simply on  recommendations from family and friends.328  
 The rise of online reviews of attorneys has created both challenges 
and opportunities for lawyer regulation. The challenges arise from the 
psychological dynamics at play with online reviews—lawyers who feel 
threatened both personally and professionally are likely to lash out in 
response, answering negative reviews defensively and sometimes revealing 
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confidential or privileged information in doing so.329 But the practice also 
creates opportunities, as client reviews can be helpful in monitoring 
attorney competence and diligence, sometimes bringing problems to light 
that might otherwise have escaped disciplinary attention.330 It is true that 
clients typically lack the substantive legal knowledge that would allow 
them to evaluate matters of technical competence. Nevertheless, even 
clients without such specialized knowledge can still effectively evaluate 
non-technical matters that play into an attorney’s competence, most 
importantly responsiveness, communication, and billing practices.331 This 
information can play a useful role both in helping prospective clients 
identify attorneys they might (or might not) want to hire, and in helping 
disciplinary bodies identify potential problems.  
3. Integrating Artificial Intelligence into Legal Practice 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is playing an increasingly large role in legal 
practice just as it does in medical practice. In some cases, the legal system 
is required to grapple with the consequences and biases of AI. For example, 
three individuals—all Black men—were wrongfully arrested as a result of 
errors in a facial identification tool.332 Even though the cases did not 
proceed to a conviction, the arrest and initial detention created significant 
disruption in the lives of those wrongly accused.333  
 Moreover, facial identification is only the beginning.  Once a person 
is arrested, some local justice systems will use “an algorithm that 
evaluates the defendant’s risk [of reoffending] rather than money to 
determine whether a defendant can be released before trial.”334 These 
algorithms are prone to bias and error.  One study revealed that an 
algorithm  incorrectly labeled Black defendants as likely to reoffend almost 
twice as frequently as it did White defendants, and it mislabeled White 
defendants as low-risk more often than Black defendants.335  The legal 
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profession hasn’t yet established a way to address AI harm or to 
systematically consider whether the benefits of algorithmic assessments 
outweigh their potential hazards. 
Artificial intelligence also plays an increasingly large role in the day-
to-day practice of law. Lawyers may not be aware of the extent to which 
they are increasingly integrating AI into ordinary legal practice. One author 
has explained how AI is embedded in everyday legal-research tools:  
Anybody using Google for any sort of research is using one 
of the world’s most advanced AI-backed tools for legal work, 
whether they’re looking into an opponent’s business entities, 
combing through news articles for a quote to cite, trying to 
find the right government agency website for filing a form, or 
looking for a legal blog post summarizing the implications of 
an obscure subsection of ERISA they’ve never heard of.336 
Artificial intelligence may also be integrated into more specialized 
systems. IBM’s Ross, for example (a version of the Watson AI platform 
tailored to legal practice), garnered a great deal of attention in legal 
circles.337 Ross was described as the “world’s first AI lawyer” and was added 
to Baker & Hostetler’s bankruptcy practice several years ago.338   
 When used for legal research and information management, 
artificial intelligence systems can offer significant benefits by making 
information more easily available. Many companies are already integrating 
AI into their contract-review processes—a big task when “large enterprises 
will have millions of outstanding contracts, with thousands of different 
counterparties, across numerous internal divisions.”339 AI systems allow 
companies to move away from a siloed approach to information and can 
allow for easier access to the details of thousands of contracts at once, 
facilitating comparison, standardization, and management of contractual 
obligations.  
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Artificial intelligence also makes it easier to analyze thousands of 
litigation outcomes at once and thus to predict the likely outcome of future 
cases. According to one company, “its AI can predict case outcomes with 
90% accuracy.”340 The ability to predict litigation outcomes can, in turn, 
improve advice to clients about whether it is worth pushing forward with 
a lawsuit and how much it is worth paying to do so. Making it easier to 
estimate a case’s value likewise increases the comfort level of outside 
litigation funding entities and thus makes it more likely that lawsuits will 
be able to attract outside funding.341 
The legal system’s greater reliance on artificial intelligence will 
almost certainly change the legal system in both foreseeable and 
unforeseeable ways. One predictable effect is that adopting new AI systems 
may be more attractive to corporate clients than to the law firms that serve 
them. Most law firms, after all, bill by the hour and profit from the value 
added by human analysis.342 Corporations, on the other hand, reap 
significantly greater benefits from being able to synthesize legal knowledge 
quickly and reduce the hours dedicated to organizing and maintaining 
legal information. 
New technology can be both very helpful and very flawed—thus 
encouraging users to rely on it without fully understanding its limitations. 
Professor Brian Sheppard has described concerns about “skill fade” and 
“out of the loop problems” that can arise from the integration of AI 
systems.343 Skill fade occurs when lawyers come to rely so heavily on 
computer-assisted analysis that they cannot conduct the analysis 
themselves. This phenomenon has been identified in other areas. It has 
been noted, for example, that “autopilot can lead to a decline in pilot 
skill.”344 A fully mature technology might be reliable enough that it won’t 
matter if human skills are lost. But we are not yet at that point.  
The same process is likely to play out in AI systems used in health 
care and legal practice.345 Sometimes the value added outweighs the 
erosion of skill so strongly that there is little net loss. Computer-aided 
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citation checking, for example, is both faster and more comprehensive 
than old-fashioned Shepardizing with books was.346 But when skill is lost, 
individuals may lack the knowledge to recognize when “out of the loop” 
problems occur—that is, when problems crop up that the underlying 
algorithm fails to recognize or address.347  
Skill fade and out-of-the-loop problems are likely to occur when 
technological ability outstrips its reliability. Computerized systems are 
growing increasingly able to augment or replace legal work, but this growth 
is currently uneven, resulting in “incomplete innovation.”348 This uneven 
development creates a risk that individuals will be tempted to over-rely on 
algorithmic analysis before it has progressed to a point where it is reliable 
enough to substitute for human judgment.349 The benefits of AI-assisted 
legal analysis are so strong that there is little doubt their role will expand. 
As the legal system’s reliance on algorithms grows, it becomes increasingly 
important to “adopt approaches that preserve our ability and motivation 
to monitor and assess the justice system itself.”350 
V. RETHINKING REGULATION AT SCALE 
Professional regulation in the twenty-first century faces two converging 
trends. First, the Supreme Court has adopted stricter control on the 
regulation of speech, limiting the scope and structure of professional 
regulatory authority. Second, the growth of massive digital platforms and 
technological innovations are re-shaping both law and health care, giving 
rise to new regulatory challenges. This creates difficulty for state 
regulatory authorities, because the new Supreme Court jurisprudence 
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(allowing the recovery of funds spend on computerized cite-checking because “such tasks 
can more quickly and accurately be done by computer”). 
347 Sheppard, supra note 343; Alan Wolf & Lynn Wishart, Shepard's and Keycite Are Flawed 
(or Maybe It's You), 75 N.Y. St. B.J. 24, 25 (September 2003) (explaining that computer-
assisted citation checking went through a period where this was a significant problem, as 
online citators failed to pick up situations where the holding of one case was overruled by 
another that did not specifically mention the first). 
348 Brian Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the Premature Disruption of Legal Services, 
2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1797, 1808 (2015). 
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seems to limit their power just as new problems emerge and need 
attention.  
But even if the convergence of these trends creates a certain amount of 
difficulty, it also creates new opportunities for creative regulation that 
safeguards constitutional rights. As scholar David Han has pointed out, 
“technological change plays a vital role in the evolution and development 
of constitutional rights doctrine.”351 He argues that “the destabilizing force 
of technological change on constitutional rights doctrine ultimately serves 
as a valuable opportunity for courts to reevaluate, in a deep and 
meaningful manner, the fundamental theoretical, intuitional, and 
empirical judgments that underlie the existing doctrinal framework.”352  
This section examines what such reevaluation might look like for 
professional regulation in law and in health care. If regulators can no 
longer rely primarily on speech-restrictive regulatory approaches, what 
can they do instead? The crux of our argument is that incremental change 
in the traditional state regulatory process is insufficient to meet the 
challenges posed by changes in technological scale. Instead, it is time to 
ask the bigger questions about the underlying goals and first principles of 
professional regulation. We propose three areas of reform that account for 
changes in both the scale of professional speech and jurisprudential limits 
on regulation.  
A.  Letting Go of Obsolete Regulatory Approaches 
The first area of reform is to jettison regulatory approaches that no 
longer play a role in protecting the public’s well-being. Scholars have noted 
the presence of “regulatory inertia,” which “can be hard to break without 
an external shock, usually a tragedy or massive failure that reignites 
interest in regulation.”353 The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 provided such 
an external shock, and both law and medicine were quick to respond in 
ways that swiftly integrated technology and removed protectionist barriers.  
 As a response to the COVID-19 pandemic, federal and state 
regulators further relaxed several rules in order to encourage doctors to 
offer telemedicine rather than in-person patient appointments.354  These 
nimble responses to the pandemic illustrate the potential for regulatory 
flexibility. Examples of temporary measures that government authorities 
implemented in 2020 include: 
                                          
351 David S. Han, Constitutional Rights and Technological Change, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 71, 
130 (2020). 
352 Id. 
353 Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 227 (2014). 
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 Some states loosened or eliminated particular licensing 
requirements so that clinicians could serve patients in other states 
without obtaining additional licenses.355   
 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued 
waivers that eliminated barriers to telemedicine use for Medicare 
patients.356  These include expanding the types of eligible 
practitioners and allowing audio-only services.357   
 CMS announced a temporary payment parity program for Medicare 
by which clinicians could be paid equally for telemedicine and in-
person visits.358 
 Some states relaxed their Medicaid requirements.359 These policies 
include expanding the categories of clinicians that can be 
reimbursed for telemedicine visits and paying for telemedicine 
treatment of new patients that did not previously have an in-person 
visit.360 
 
Regulations affecting the practice of law were also loosened in 
response to the pandemic. For the first time in its 231-year history, the 
Supreme Court heard oral arguments remotely.361 Other courts held video 
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hearings and even experimented with jury trials by video conference.362 Law 
firms allowed lawyers to work out of their houses, increasing pressure on 
state regulators to acknowledge that “remote working” should be “outside 
the purview” of unauthorized practice restrictions.363 Difficulties in holding 
an in-person bar examination also caused some states to loosen initial 
licensing restrictions and increased support for diploma privilege.364 
 Regulatory policies that were loosened for the pandemic should be 
re-evaluated when the pandemic is over. Not every change needs to be 
made permanent, but innovations and technological advances that were 
borne out of necessity might suggest areas in which older restrictions have 
outlived their value. 
B.  Increasing Government Speech 
In addition to abandoning outdated policies, professional regulatory 
entities should become more vocal advocates in areas where their actions 
can have the greatest public benefit. The Supreme Court has hinted that 
government entities should consider ramping up efforts to engage in their 
own communication. In Sorrell, for example, the Supreme Court suggested 
that if Vermont was “displeased that detailers who use prescriber-
identifying information are effective in promoting brand-name drugs,” then 
it could “express that view through its own speech.”365  
 Governmental speech can reflect regulatory policy directly, without 
going through licensed professionals as intermediaries. It therefore allows 
regulatory entities to engage in “complete editorial control.”366 Such 
editorial control may be especially useful in combatting problems of 
misinformation shared online. Social media has enabled attorneys and 
medical practitioners to reach international audiences, sometimes 
disseminating conspiracy theories and other pernicious information.367 
Medical and legal professionals often have outsized influence because they 
appear to be credible experts,368 and thus their falsehoods can do great 
harm.  
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Regulating professional speech is challenging in light of First 
Amendment concerns.369 States have developed different approaches to 
disciplining physicians for misleading speech, though some of the policies 
may be vulnerable to First Amendment challenges. California’s Manual of 
Model Disciplinary Orders and Disciplinary Guidelines, establishes 
penalties for dishonesty that is “substantially related to the qualifications, 
function or duties of a physician and surgeon but not arising from or 
occurring during patient care, treatment, management or billing.”370  This 
would presumably encompass statements made on social media.  The 
minimum penalty for such misconduct is “stayed revocation, 5 years 
probation” and the maximum penalty is license revocation.371 Minnesota 
may discipline physicians even more broadly for “any unethical or 
improper conduct,” including conduct likely to deceive, defraud, or harm 
the public.”372  Disciplinary measures can include license revocation or 
suspension, revocation or suspension of registration to conduct interstate 
telemedicine, placement of limitations or conditions on a physician's 
practice, civil penalties of up to $10,000 per violation, and more.373 By 
contrast, Texas does not include dishonesty or spreading false information 
to the public as acts subject to discipline by the state medical board.374  
It is possible that restrictive disciplinary policies would survive the 
Supreme Court’s application of heightened review. To prevail, the state 
would have to develop a strong evidentiary record of the harms caused by 
the false statements as well as the lack of a narrower way to combat those 
harms.375 In addition, the state would bear the burden of proving falsity—
a difficult proposition when it comes to professional speech, as 
professional opinion may differ in areas without scientific consensus. 
Nevertheless, because of the reach and impact of social media, state 
boards should not turn a blind eye to legal and medical professionals’ 
misconduct via these platforms.  When the government can develop proof 
of direct harm from false speech, it can sustain professional discipline even 
under Alvarez.376 The adoption of an intermediate-scrutiny standard for 
professional speech—a possibility left open by NIFLA— would increase the 
likelihood that states could develop an evidentiary record sufficient to 
                                          
tiktok-youtube-misinformation-pandemic/ (“Their medical credentials give their thoughts 
on the virus added weight.”). 
369 See supra Part II. 
370 Medical Board of California, Manual of Model Disciplinary Orders and Disciplinary 
Guidelines 24 (2016). 
371 Id. 
372 MINN. STAT. §147.091(g) (2020). 
373 MINN. STAT. §147.141(2020). 
374 TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22 §190.8 (2020). 
375 See supra text associated with notes 189-195. 
376 See supra text associated with notes 189-195. 
59  55 UC DAVIS L.REV. (forthcoming 2022). 1/1/21 
 
 
discipline professionals who disseminate false information likely to cause 
harm.377 But when creating an adequate evidentiary record is challenging, 
it may be easier for government entities to let their own voices be heard in 
order to counter falsehoods. 
The government can engage in direct public education, can 
publicize areas of scientific agreement, and can communicate its own 
viewpoint.378 The Supreme Court’s case law has been largely protective 
both of individual speech and of governmental speech.379 When the 
government regulates others’ speech, content-based restrictions are 
judged by heightened scrutiny.380 But when the government itself is the 
speaker, heightened scrutiny does not apply.381  
To the extent that regulatory entities are concerned about the 
dissemination of false speech online (and they should be concerned about 
it), the best course of action might be for regulatory entities to engage in 
their own efforts at public education rather than feeling bound to maintain  
neutrality even when it contradicts professional consensus.  Indeed, 
during the COVID-19 epidemic government speech became a vital public 
health tool.  Messaging about the importance of wearing masks and social 
distancing was ever-present and indispensable in the face of dangerous 
conspiracy theories and irresponsible risk-taking.382 
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C. Coordinating Beyond Borders 
Finally, just as legal practice and health care have expanded beyond 
traditional borders, so too must regulatory authority. This requires looking 
beyond mere state-based professional licensing. Regulatory policy might 
cross state or even national borders. But regulatory coordination might 
also cross more theoretical boundaries, bringing together different 
professional disciplines or engaging in creative public-private 
partnerships. 
1. Coordination of Professional Disciplines 
As this article has shown, there is a great deal of similarity in the 
regulatory challenges faced by different professions. Especially when it 
comes to the challenges posed by technological innovation, regulatory 
authorities should work together to identify areas of common concern. The 
growth of artificial intelligence, for example, raises concerns that are not 
unique to any particular discipline—issues of racial or gender bias in 
algorithms, skill fade, and out-of-the-loop problems exist wherever AI is 
implemented. Government entities should set up regulatory structures 
that provide input from law, medicine, and other professions and allow 
cross-disciplinary coordination to develop best practices for integrating 
and optimizing emerging technologies. 
2. Public-Private Collaboration 
Many of the “regulation at scale” issues in professional regulation arise 
from the widespread influence of massive digital platforms. When possible, 
governmental authorities should collaborate with these platforms and 
integrate them into regulatory policies. Thus, for example, online review 
sites have created new regulatory challenges, especially when 
professionals seek to respond to negative reviews online, but they also offer 
additional information, giving regulatory authorities a limited window to 
client and patient concerns.383 Professional regulatory bodies should seek 
to work with the larger platforms and internet intermediaries. The private 
entities may welcome assistance in developing content moderation 
guidelines and might also offer a forum for government speech that 
educates the public about professional standards and regulatory 
procedures.384  
3. Geographic Flexibility 
Technology enables attorneys and medical clinicians to practice on 
a national scale through telemedicine and online legal practice.385  
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Consequently, it makes little sense to continue to regulate attorneys and 
physicians exclusively on a state by state basis. Moreover, facilitating the 
practice of law and medicine across state borders would enhance 
underserved populations’ access to health care and legal assistance.  
Individuals who live in rural areas with few lawyers or medical specialists 
could obtain the services of highly skilled professionals by electronic 
means without the cost of travel. As noted above, regulators have already 
removed barriers to a more national practice of telemedicine.386 States 
have established mechanisms of special licenses or compacts to facilitate 
interstate licensure.387 
Long before COVID-19, advocates called for full reciprocity of state 
medical licenses, not just for purposes of telemedicine. For example, in 
2014 the prominent Health Affairs Blog published a piece arguing that 
“states should adopt mutual recognition agreements in which they honor 
each other’s physician licenses.”388 Calls for a permanent change have 
gained momentum during the current pandemic.389 Physicians have 
argued that state licensure restrictions defy logic because human anatomy 
is the same everywhere on the planet and medical training is regulated at 
a national level.390 Moreover, COVID-19 has shown that licensure barriers 
can deprive patients of desperately needed care and cost lives.391 In the 
coming months and years, regulatory authorities should carefully evaluate 
the benefits and shortcomings of state-by-state licensure requirements 
with an eye to determining the extent to which they can be further relaxed.  
 When it comes to the practice of law, states have made concerted 
efforts to coordinate their licensing practices. A majority of states now offer 
the Uniform Bar Exam, replacing the prior patchwork of exam coverage 
and practices.392 This is a good first step, but more is needed. In law, as in 
medicine, overly broad state prohibitions on unauthorized practice have 
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inhibited practice flexibility and client access. Coordinating policy between 
the states could help avoid regulatory overreach, allowing states to focus 
on areas of real importance. The states should build on earlier 
coordination that led to the adoption of the Uniform Bar Exam and the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.393 The Model Rules already provide 
some guidance for what kinds of conduct will fall under each jurisdiction’s 
regulatory authority.394 The states should take this coordination a step 
further, adopting uniform rules to protect lawyers’ ability to live in one 
state while practicing law in another.  They should also establish national 
norms that define the “practice of law” in a way that protects the rights of 
non-lawyers to engage in speech about legal matters.395  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Regulatory bodies are facing new challenges in enforcing standards 
of care and providing professional oversight. The Supreme Court has 
grown increasingly protective of professionals’ free speech rights and has 
thereby limited the government’s power to engage in traditional regulatory 
activities that might limit professional speech. At the same time, 
technological developments, including the growth of massive digital 
platforms and the introduction of artificial intelligence programs, create 
brand new regulatory challenges. The convergence of these two trends 
means that incremental change in the traditional state regulatory process 
will be ineffectual. We propose three primary pathways for reform: 1) 
abandoning obsolete regulatory approaches, 2) engaging in direct 
government speech to counter the growth of misinformation, and 3) most 
importantly, coordinating beyond traditional borders—that is, breaking 
down disciplinary separations, coordinating public and private 
enterprises, and moving toward more national oversight. Only by asking 
the bigger questions about the underlying goals and first principles of 
professional regulation can the government rise to the challenges posed by 
technological development in a way that preserves professionals’ free-
speech rights.   
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